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ARTICLES
REGULATORY INCENTIVE REALIGNMENT
AND THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF BANK
RESOLUTION
Dr. Andromachi Georgosouli*
ABSTRACT
Risks associated with incentive misalignment are liable to seriously
jeopardize the effectiveness of bank resolution, when not properly
contained. This Article considers the management of misaligned incentives
between regulators that are found in a vertical relationship of public
governance. Using the EU legal framework of bank resolution as its case
study, this Article explores the effectiveness of the quasi-enforcement
powers of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and, where relevant, of the
European Banking Authority (EBA) as an incentive realignment legal
technique. Two principal difficulties are identified: on the one hand, the
problematic interinstitutional dynamic of the SRB and the EBA and, on the
other hand, the exposure of these two EU agencies to legal contestation.
Although this Article questions the wisdom of enforcement avoidance as an
optimal long-term strategy, its purpose is not to defend enforcement as a
means for incentive realignment, but rather, to warn of the obstacles lying
ahead should the SRB and the EBA decide to go down that path. The key
message of this Article is that, if there is a case to be made for EU agency
enforcement action as a means for incentive realignment, further medium
and long-term reform will be required to (a) improve the effectiveness of
the enforcement powers of the EU agencies, (b) ameliorate instances of
bank nationalism, which is traditionally a major source of regulatory
misalignment in Europe, and (c) strengthen the incentive-based elements
that are already embodied into the EU system of financial regulation.
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis and the collapse of
Fortis1 in Belgium, the EU moved to a harmonized bank resolution regime.2
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The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single
Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRM Regulation) stand at the epicenter
of the EU legal framework of bank resolution.3 The BRRD rules mirror the
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions of
the Financial Stability Board (FSB).4 They apply to all 28 EU Member
States once transposed into domestic law. The SRM Regulation provides
the institutional framework for the implementation of the BRRD rules in the
Banking Union by establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).5
Key features of the EU legal framework include administrative (as opposed
to court-based) proceedings, early intervention, recovery measures and
resolution tools, and the conferral of adequate powers to resolution
authorities at both the Member State and EU level.6
While the EU bank resolution regime is mostly implemented, however,
its effectiveness may be undermined due to misaligned incentives between
EU and Member State resolution agencies.7 Risks associated with
misaligned regulatory incentives can be particularly acute at the Member
1. On the legacy of Fortis, see SERAINA N. GRUNEWALD, THE RESOLUTION OF CROSS
BORDER BANKING CRISES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A LEGAL STUDY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF BURDEN SHARING 67 (2014); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION
GROUP, at para. 33 (2010) [hereinafter BASEL REPORT], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf;
Mads Andenas & Iris H.-Y. Chiu, Financial Stability and Legal Integration in Financial
Regulation, 38 EUR. L. REV. 335, 345 (2013).
2. The terms “regime” and “framework” are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
3. See Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment
Firms and Amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC,
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU, 2013/36/EU, and Regulations
(EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
2014 O.J. (L 173) 190 [hereinafter BRRD]; Regulation 806/2014, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 15 July 2014 Establishing Uniform Rules and a Uniform Procedure for the
Resolution of Credit Institutions and Certain Investment Firms in the Framework of a Single
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and Amending Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010, 2014 O.J. (L 225) 1 [hereinafter SRM Regulation]. Both the BRRD and the SRM
Regulation were adopted on the basis of Article 114 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union for the approximation of laws of Member States for the
purposes of the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 114,
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 94 [hereinafter TFEU].
4. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf (this
publication is an updated version of the original 2011 publication).
5. See infra Part II for further discussion of the Banking Union and the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM).
6. See GRUNEWALD, supra note 1, at 234.
7. Similar problems occur in the context of the SSM in relation to the prudential supervision
function of the ECB. See Eddy Wymeersch, The Single Supervisory Mechanism or ‘SSM’, Part
One of the Banking Union 13 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law Working Paper No. 240/2014,
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397800 (describing the SSM as a
“two-tier system” with national prudential regulators acting either on behalf of the ECB or as the
main prudential regulators depending on the systemic significance of the bank in question).
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State level. A national resolution authority may delay the execution of a
resolution measure for a multitude of reasons.8 For instance, it may have a
different perception of the urgency of the situation, it may have different
priorities due to budgetary constraints, or it may be acting under political or
industry pressure.9
The effective management of incentive misalignment is crucial in view
of the short timeframe within which a bank resolution must be executed and
the deplorable consequences should resolution agencies fail to act promptly.
Memoranda of understanding and informal channels of communication
between EU and Member State regulators usually help overcome problems.
However, they have their own limitations and cannot be relied upon
entirely.10 For example, their effectiveness to bridge differences and smooth
out cooperation is contingent on a pre-existing relationship of trust and on
the genuine willingness of the regulatory agencies to cooperate—namely,
parameters that may not be there in the first place. Consequently, the
treatment of regulatory incentive misalignment also calls for other forms of
action.
As long as a Member State acts in breach of EU law, one possibility is
the European Commission (Commission) initiating EU enforcement by
virtue of Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU).11 The decision to resort to TFEU Article 258 lies entirely on
the discretion of the Commission. It is time consuming and it may never
bear the desired fruits. An alternative and arguably more workable option is
to delegate quasi-enforcement powers to EU agencies. This Article explores
the effectiveness of such powers as means for incentive realignment,
making special reference to the Single Resolution Board (SRB)12 and,
8. A national resolution authority is typically a Member State public agency that is authorized
to apply the resolution tools and exercise resolution powers. See BRRD, supra note 3, arts. 2(18),
3(1)–(2).
9. Martin $ihák, Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt & R. Barry Johnston, Incentive Audits: A New
Approach to Financial Regulation 4 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Fin. and Private
Sector
Dev.
Team,
Policy
Research
Working
Paper
No.
6308,
2013),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12199/wps6308.pdf?sequence=1.
10. See BASEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10–11.
11. According to TFEU Article 291(1), Member States must implement EU law, if necessary,
by taking measures to prevent or terminate breaches of EU law. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 291(1).
12. The SRB is an EU agency with legal personality. See id. art. 42(1). The SRB is established
by the SRM Regulation. SRM Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl, para. 11. The SRB was launched
on January 1, 2015, and it will be fully operational with a complete set of resolution powers
beginning January 2016. The SRB comprises a Chair, a Vice-Chair, four full time executive
members and a member appointed by each participating Member-State representing the national
resolution authority. Id. art. 43(1). According to SRM Regulation Article 43(3), representatives of
the ECB and the Commission have permanent observer status in plenary and executive sessions.
Id. art. 43(3). The SRB is mainly funded by bank levies and it has the capacity to borrow. The
SRB is accountable to the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission. Id. art. 45(1).
In addition, it is required to respond to questions from the national Parliaments of SRM
participating Member States. Id. art. 46(1)–(2). Furthermore, there is an internal appeal panel and
proceedings may be brought before the European Court of Justice. Id. arts. 85(1), 86(1). The
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where relevant, the European Banking Authority (EBA).13 In regards to EU
bank resolution, the key message of this Article is that, if there is a case to
be made for EU agency enforcement action as a means for incentive
realignment, further medium and long-term reform will be required.
Although this Article casts doubt on the wisdom of enforcement avoidance
as an optimal strategy in the long term, the purpose of this Article is not to
defend enforcement as a means for incentive realignment, but rather, to
warn of the obstacles lying ahead should the SRB and the EBA decide to go
down that path.
With the SRB becoming fully operational in January 2016 and without
prior record of the EBA using its quasi-enforcement powers, it is uncertain
whether enforcement will ever be used for the purposes of incentive
realignment in the context of bank resolution.14 To be sure, there is a range
of other legal techniques for the tackling of incentive misalignment
alongside enforcement. These include (a) mediation (currently vested with
the EBA under EBA Regulation Article 19), (b) provision for cross border
coordination groups (for instance the resolution colleges of BRRD Article
88), (c) the transferring of decision-making from Member State to EU
agencies, which (as discussed in greater detail later) is a prominent feature
of the SRM of the Banking Union, and (d) the imposition of technical
constraints over the exercise of administrative discretion that is left to
national resolution authorities.15 Enforcement itself is thought of as a
peripheral matter and something to be avoided in view of its drastic nature.
The trouble is that enforcement cannot be avoided forever. More often than
envisaged degree of centralization of the SRM decision-making is considerable compared with
decision-making with regards to bank resolution outside the Banking Union and the SRM.
13. See Regulation 1093/2010, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Amending
Decision No. 716/2009/EC and Repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, art. 19, 2010 O.J.
(L. 331) 12, 25 [hereinafter EBA Regulation]. The EBA is one of the three European Supervisory
Authorities. The other two are the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The EBA can also resort to
its dispute resolution powers under EBA Regulation Article 19 for the realignment of incentives in
the context of horizontal relationships, as for instance, among resolution agencies of Member
States in the course of a cross-border bank resolution. The examination of the effectiveness of this
power as an instrument for the realignment of incentives is beyond the scope of this Article.
14. So far, the European Supervisory Authorities has been reluctant to initiate enforcement.
Informal pressure on national regulators behind closed doors has been the norm. See Report from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Operation of the European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), at 9,
COM (2014) 509 final (Aug. 8, 2014) (noting the correlation between the composition of the
respective boards of the European Supervisory Authorities and the unpopularity of the adoption of
binding intrusive measures).
15. According to the relevant literature, regulatory incentive misalignment could be
ameliorated by improving transparency, reducing information asymmetries, enhancing the
accountability and operational independence of regulators, and by simplifying rules. See
generally, $ihák, Demirgüç-Kunt & Johnston, supra note 9; Ross Levine, The Sentinel:
Improving the Governance of Financial Regulation (Nov. 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1498757.
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not, regulators resort to enforcement precisely because all other strategies
have failed. Accordingly, the question of the actual potential of EU agency
enforcement action as an incentive realignment technique merits
consideration irrespective of the frequency in which it is to be used.
Alongside the SRB and the EBA, Member State resolution agencies
and other EU institutions and agencies are also involved in bank
resolution.16 For example, the Commission has control over the provision of
state aid in bank restructuring,17 while the European Central Bank (ECB)
contributes to the recovery and resolution of Eurozone banks as a
macroprudential supervisor.18 This Article acknowledges the role of all
Member State and EU institutions and agencies, however, it depicts only a
segment of the institutional architecture that underscores EU bank
resolution. There is good reason to take a special interest in the SRB and the
EBA.19 With much of the discussion dedicated to the role of the ECB vis a
16. With regards to the tasks of the SRB in the Single Resolution Mechanism, see SRM
Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 7(1)–(2), 50 (describing the tasks of the plenary session of the
SRB), 54 (describing the tasks of the executive session of the SRB). The scope of the EBA powers
is not determined by the EBA Regulation exclusively. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 1.
Article 1(2), in particular, stipulates that “[t]he Authority shall act within the powers conferred by
this Regulation and within the scope . . . of any further legally binding Union act which confers
tasks on the Authority.” Id. The EBA exercises powers over national competent authorities,
namely Member State prudential supervisors of financial institutions like banks. Id. art. 4(2)
(providing the definition of “competent authorities”); see also Directive 2006/48/EC, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions (Recast), art. 4(4), 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1. National resolution
authorities fall within the definition of “competent authorities” for the purposes of the EBA
Regulation. See BRRD, supra note 3, art. 125(1) (amending EBA Regulation Article 4(2)); see
also id. at pmbl, para. 125 (explaining that the assimilation “between resolution authorities and
competent authorities pursuant to Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 is consistent with the functions
attributed to the EBA pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No. 1093/2010 to contribute and
participate actively in the development and coordination of recovery and resolution plans and to
aim at the facilitation of the resolution of failing institutions and in particular cross-border
groups.”). It is also worth noting that Member States have the discretion to designate a “competent
authority” as a “resolution authority” under BRRD Article 3(1)–(3). See id. art. 3(1)–(3). For
further on this point, see id. at pmbl, para. 18.
17. Once the BRRD and the SRM Regulation are fully in force, the use of state aid for bank
restructuring will be marginalized. See ROEL THEISSEN, EU BANKING SUPERVISION 852–56
(Eleven Int’l Publ’g ed., 2013) (identifying the elimination of state aid and the associated implicit
public guarantee enjoyed by systemic banks as key drivers of the introduction of an EU legal
framework of bank recovery and resolution).
18. Strictly speaking, the ECB is not vested with a resolution mandate. The ECB has a
monetary policy and a financial stability mandate. See TFEU, supra note 3, art. 127; see also infra
Part II.
19. This convoluted institutional setup is the end result of attempts to ensure that the operation
of the EU agencies will be consistent with the principles of EU law, including the Meroni
doctrine. As it is briefly discussed infra at Part II, according to the traditional interpretation of the
Meroni doctrine, it is unlawful to delegate powers to EU agencies that involve a wide margin of
discretion. It also reflects the tension between supra-nationalism and inter-governmentalism that
shapes policy and legal developments in EU financial regulation. The conceptualization of intergovernmentalism and inter-institutionalism as dynamics in a relationship of tension and potential
trade-off finds support in European integration theories. See generally MARTIN SAETER,
COMPREHENSIVE NEOFUNCTIONALISM: BRIDGING REALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE STUDY OF
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vis other institutions in the context of crisis prevention and management,
the likely interaction of the SRB and the EBA remains, for the time being,
the least visible and arguably the most unpredictable dimension of the EU
system of bank resolution.20
The focus on the SRB and the EBA is also appropriate for two further
reasons. The SRB and the EBA are not simply involved in a bank
resolution; at least on paper, they seem to emerge out of a complex EU
institutional architecture as EU resolution agencies. While the SRB has an
exclusive bank resolution mandate for the purposes of the SRM, the EBA is
a European Supervisory Authority (ESA) with a broad array of tasks
pertaining to the supervision and regulation of EU banks, including their
resolution.21 To be sure, the leadership of the SRB within the SRM confines
the EBA to an ancillary albeit crucial role. Outside the SRM, however, the
EBA assumes its authoritative position on all matters covered by the Single
Rulebook including those pertaining to bank resolution.22 Moreover, the
delegation of quasi-enforcement powers to the SRB and the EBA—namely
two EU agencies—raises issues of constitutionality that otherwise would
not exist if the same or similar powers were vested in EU institutions,
whose mandate is directly founded on TFEU provisions (as opposed to EU
secondary legislation). The latter is in itself a further source of concern
because it suggests that the robustness of the legal underpinnings of the
enforcement mandate of the SRB and the EBA should not be taken for
granted.23
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with a brief description of
the quasi-enforcement powers of the SRB and the EBA. Since the EBA has
a longer history compared with that of the SRB, the powers of the EBA are
considered first and then those of the SRB are discussed second. Part II
provides a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of these powers.
Two key difficulties are discussed: first, the problematic inter-institutional
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1998); EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE
(Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). For a critical appraisal of
this strand of thought, see Adriaan Schout & Sarah Wolff, The ‘Paradox of Lisbon’:
Supranationalism – Intergovernmentalism as an Administrative Concept, in THE EU’S LISBON
TREATY: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AND IMPLEMENTATION 21 (Finn Laursen ed., 2016).
20. See Wymeersch, supra note 7.
21. BBVA RESEARCH, REGULATION OUTLOOK: COMPENDIUM ON BANK RESOLUTION
REGIMES: FROM THE FSB TO THE EU AND US FRAMEWORKS 14 (2014),
https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Regulation-Outlook.pdf (pointing out
inter alia that the EBA is given an important role in the supervision of the bank resolution
framework).
22. The Single Rulebook refers to a constellation of EU law governing the single market for
banking and financial services. See Single Rulebook, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/policies/banking-union/single-rulebook/ (last updated Apr. 3, 2016).
23. See NICOLAS VERON, EUROPE’S RADICAL BANKING UNION 32–33 (Bruegel Essay and
Lecture Series ed. 2015), http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/essay_NV_
CMU.pdf (noting more generally that the legal robustness of the Single Resolution Mechanism
and the inter-governmental agreement for the Single Resolution Fund is yet to be tested).

2016]

The EU Legal Framework of Bank Resolution

349

dynamic of the SRB and the EBA, and second, the increased risk of legal
contestation that both the SRB and the EBA are exposed to. The Article
concludes with some tentative recommendations for reform. Although the
EU legal framework of bank recovery and resolution covers banks and
certain large investment firms, for expository purposes, reference will be
made to bank resolution only.24 A detailed overview of the legal provisions
of the BRRD and the SRM Resolution falls beyond the scope of this
Article.25 Similarly, it is not the purpose of this Article to explore the
uneasy coexistence of the jurisdictional domains of the European Single
Market and the Banking Union.26 The supervisory remit of the ECB poses
its own challenges in the context of bank recovery and resolution. These
merit separate consideration and will not be discussed in this Article save in
passing.27
I. THE QUASI-ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE SRB AND THE
EBA
A prevalent task of the EBA is to contribute to the consistent
application of EU law across all EU Member States—if necessary, by
making use of its quasi-enforcement powers.28 These powers comprise the
ability to investigate alleged breaches of EU law, issue recommendations,
and direct binding decisions. The founding EBA Regulation does not confer
sanctioning powers to the EBA.29 Sanctioning remains a domestic affair.30
The quasi-enforcement powers of the EBA are activated as long as the
conduct of the national competent authority constitutes prima facie
evidence of breach of EU law and, in particular, breach of all those acts
referred to in EBA Regulation Article 1(2), including, but not limited to, the
BRRD, binding EBA Implementing Technical and Regulatory Standards
pertaining to the BRRD, as well as EBA decisions under EBA Regulation
Articles 18 and 19.31 Generally speaking, a national competent authority
24. On the scope of application of the BRRD, see BRRD, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
25. See Kern Alexander, European Banking Union: A Legal and Institutional Analysis of the

Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, 40 Eur. L. Rev. 154–87
(2015); THE BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION DIRECTIVE: EUROPE’S SOLUTION FOR “TOO BIG
TO FAIL”? (Andreas Dombret & Patrick S. Kenadjian eds., 2013).
26. See Rosa M. Lastra, The Banking Union and the Single Market: Conflict or
Companionship?, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1190, 1211–23 (2013).
27. See Wymeersch, supra note 7, at 45, 48, 61, 66–68.
28. Takis Tridimas, Financial Supervision and Agency Power: Reflections on ESMA, in FROM
SINGLE MARKET TO ECONOMIC UNION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN A. USHER 55, 72–73
(Niamh Nic Shuibhne & Laurence W. Gormley eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2012) (noting the same
but in relation to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)).
29. EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17.
30. Title VIII of the BRRD provides for a harmonized regime of administrative penalties and
other administrative measures. See BRRD, supra note 3, tit. VIII.
31. Bindng Technical Standards (BTS) are always adopted by the European Commission by
means of regulations or decisions, namely, secondary EU legislation that is binding and directly
applicable to all Member States. There are two kinds of BTSs: Technical Regulatory Standards
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will be deemed to have infringed EU law when it has failed to ensure that
the bank in question satisfies the substantive and procedural requirements
of the BRRD.32 This will be the case, for example, when it fails to ensure
that a bank complies with EBA technical standards of direct applicability
concerning the format and content of recovery and resolution plans.
The procedure of EBA Regulation Article 1733 starts off with
investigations of alleged infringements of EU Law and it may escalate into
the EBA taking a binding decision against a noncomplying bank.34 During
the first stage, the EBA investigates whether a national competent authority
has failed to apply EU rules correctly. The national competent authority has
a duty to assist the EBA in its investigation by providing information that
may be of relevance to the investigation.35 The EBA must consider this
information without delay. During the second stage, and within two months
from the start of investigations, the EBA may address a recommendation to
the national competent authority under investigation. The recommendation
specifies the action that the national competent authority must take in order
to comply with EU law.36 Upon receipt of the recommendation, the national
competent authority has ten working days to respond and inform the EBA
about the steps it has taken, or the steps that it intends to take, in order to
comply. Strictly speaking, the EBA recommendation of EBA Regulation
Article 17 is soft law.37 It comes, however, with the procedural obligation to
inform the EBA about measures that have been or will be taken in order to
comply with the EBA’s recommendation.38 Failure to inform the EBA
(TRS) and Implementing Technical Standards (ITS). See TFEU, supra note 3, art. 290 (regulatory
technical standards); id. art. 291 (implementing technical standards). It is difficult to draw a
distinction between the two. Both of them are envisaged to be “technical” and, at least on paper,
they do not involve “strategic decisions,” or “policy choices.” See EBA Regulation, supra note 13,
arts. 10(1), (4); 15(1), (4); Tridimas, supra note 28, at 69 (pointing out that “drawing the
boundaries between technical and policy matters, especially in an area as complex as financial
regulation, is notoriously difficult”).
32. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(1).
33. Id.
34. Id. art. 17(6)–(7).
35. See id. art. 17(2); see also Tridimas, supra note 28, at 72 (discussing the quasienforcement powers of the ESMA, which are identical to those of the EBA); EBA Regulation,
supra note 13, pmbl., paras. 27–29 (describing the three-stage enforcement procedure).
36. See Tridimas, supra note 28, at 72 (discussing identical procedure in relation to the quasienforcement powers of the ESMA); EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(3).
37. This stage does not preclude the possibility of an informal settlement without the issuing of
a formal recommendation by the EBA. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(3). See
Tridimas, supra note 28, at 71 (arguing more generally that recommendations and guidelines
represent the ‘heavy hand of soft law’ due to the procedural requirement to give reasons justifying
non-compliance that is attached to these legal instruments).
38. See Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4416,
4420, 4421 (stating that recommendations cannot be regarded as having no legal effect at all, even
if recommendations are not able to confer rights on individuals, they nevertheless produce some
legal effects). Commenting on the circumstances where a party can challenge the validity of the
EBA’s guidelines, Takis Tridimas points out that parties whose interests are affected by a de facto
binding measure should have legal protection. See Tridimas, supra note 28, at 71.
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within ten working days of receipt of the recommendation might be viewed
as breach of EU law.39 The next stage involves the participation of the
Commission. During this stage, the Commission issues a “formal
opinion.”40 The formal opinion of the Commission is not binding.41 Within
ten working days, the national competent authority has the obligation to
inform the Commission and the EBA about the measures it has taken, or the
measures that it intends to take, in order to comply with the Commission’s
formal opinion.42 The duty to inform is procedural, and if the national
competent authority fails to inform, its conduct may be regarded as breach
of EU law.
Where the national competent authority does not comply with the
Commission’s formal opinion, the EBA proceeds to the next stage. This
involves taking direct action against the noncomplying bank in question.43
Specifically, the EBA may address a decision to the bank only if this is
deemed necessary in order to maintain or restore neutral conditions of
competition in the market, or ensure the orderly functioning and integrity of
the financial system, and only in respect to requirements that are “directly
applicable to financial market institutions.”44 The term “directly applicable”
suggests that the EBA may elect to go down that path only where the bank
fails to comply with rules other than those contained in directives, since the

39. According to EBA Regulation Article 17(3), the competent authority shall inform the EBA
about the steps it has taken or the steps that it intends to take to ensure compliance with Union
Law. For all intended purposes, its procedural requirement is similar to the recommendations of
EBA Regulation Article 16(3), although the similarities should not be exaggerated. The
recommendation of EBA Regulation Article 16 comes with a two month period of time within
which each competent authority shall confirm whether it complies or not and giving reasons in
case of non-compliance. This period of time starts from the date of the issuance of the
recommendation. Another notable difference between EBA Regulation Article 16(3) and EBA
Regulation Article 17(4) is that the competent authority is not required to give reasons to justify
its decision not to comply with the recommendation of Article 17. To be precise, unlike EBA
Regulation Article 16, EBA Regulation Article 17 does not give the ‘comply or explain’ option to
the competent authorities. Accordingly, the recommendation of the EBA Regulation Article 17
affords a far lower threshold of non-compliance. See Tridimas, supra note 28, at 71 (commenting
on the legal effect of the ESMA Regulation Article 16 recommendation and arguing that the duty
to give reasons may be said to have binding albeit procedural effects and, noting that “[f]ailure to
give reasons might be viewed as [a] breach of EU law”).
40. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(4).
41. It is open to question whether the Commission’s formal opinion of EBA Regulation
Article 17(4) is binding or not. As long as it can be argued that the Commission’s formal opinion
is indeed binding, it follows that it can be challenged by an interested party before the Board of
Appeal. Id. arts. 58–59. The founding Regulations of the European Supervisory Authorities
provide for a joint Board of Appeal for the EBA. According to EBA Regulation Article 60(1), any
natural and legal person may appeal against an Article 17 decision. Id. art. 60(1). In relation to
bank resolution, this includes national resolution authorities.
42. Id. art. 17(5).
43. See id. art. 17(6).
44. Id.; Tridimas, supra note 28, at 73 (commenting on identical procedure of ESMA
Regulation Article 1).
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latter are not directly applicable.45 Consequently, the EBA will be able to
address a decision to the bank for breach of those EBA regulatory
standards, which complement the BRRD. The power of the EBA under
Article 17(6) operates without prejudice to the Commission’s general
enforcement power under TFEU Article 258.46 According to Article 17(6),
the decision of the EBA is binding to the bank to which it is addressed, but
it is less clear whether it is also binding to the national competent
authority.47 It is argued that the EBA decision is binding to both the national
competent authority and the bank for mainly two reasons: first, because the
EBA decision prevails over earlier decisions of the national competent
authority, and second, because natural and legal persons have the right to
appeal against this decision.48
If a bank fails to comply with the decision of the EBA, it will be in
breach of EU law. The EBA does not have the power to impose sanctions
directly against the bank. In any case, the purpose of the EBA exercising its
quasi-enforcement powers is to create a chain of infringements of EU law
for both the national competent authority and the bank in question. When
credible, the prospect of ending up with a chain of EU law infringements is
not a trivial matter for the purposes of incentive realignment. To the extent
that it erodes the respective lines of defense of the bank and the national
competent authority, it is liable to change their incentives, making them
more willing to abide by EU law.
In the context of the SRM, the SRB has overall responsibility for the
effective and consistent functioning of the SRM.49 Where the SRB adopts a
resolution scheme, it is for the national resolution authority to undertake the
execution of the resolution scheme.50 The SRB monitors the execution and
gives instructions where appropriate.51 According to SRM Regulation
Article 29, the national resolution authority has the obligation to take any
necessary action for the implementation of SRB decisions. To this end, the
SRB can inter alia issue guidelines and general instructions to the national
resolution authority and it may request information and/or carry out general
investigations and on-site inspections.52 The SRB may issue a warning to
45. “The limitation also flows from the established principles of EU law, under which the
doctrine of direct effect of directives applies only in favour of and not against individuals.”
Tridimas, supra note 28, at 73. When individuals can rely on EU law in domestic courts, then the
EU law instrument in question has direct effect. Treaties and regulations are directly effective.
46. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(6).
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 60; see also Tridimas, supra note 28, at 75.
49. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 7(1).
50. The resolution scheme is adopted according to the procedure of SRM Regulation Article
18. Id. art. 18.
51. Id. art. 28.
52. Id. arts. 31(1)(a)–(b), 34, 35, 36, 37. Furthermore, the SRB shall receive from national
resolution authorities draft decisions on which it may express views, and, in particular, indicate
the elements of the draft decision that do not comply with this Regulation or with the Board’s
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ensure consistency with high resolution standards.53 Where the resolution
authority fails to comply with a decision of the SRB or more generally fails
to apply an SRB decision properly, the SRB does not need to implicate the
Commission before escalating things further. The SRB can go ahead and
directly order the bank under resolution to take appropriate action.54
The SRB power to directly address a decision ordering the bank under
resolution to take a specific course of action is significantly circumscribed.
The SRB is allowed to do so only in the context of the resolution procedure
of SRM Regulation Article 18, where the bank under resolution has failed
to transfer specified rights, assets, or liabilities to another person for the
purposes of SRM Regulation Article 21 concerning the power of the SRB
to write down and convert capital instruments, or where the bank has failed
to adopt any other action that is necessary in order to comply with the SRB
decision in question.55 In the latter case, it is not enough to establish that the
national resolution authority failed to apply the measure or that it failed to
apply the measure to the satisfaction of the SRB. In addition, the failure of
the national resolution authority must be demonstrably grave enough to
pose a threat to any of the resolution objectives under SRM Regulation
Article 14, or to the efficient implementation of the resolution scheme.56
Finally, the measure that is communicated through the decision of the SRB
to the bank must be capable of addressing the threat to the relevant
resolution objective or the threat to the relevant resolution scheme. The
SRB decisions are binding for both the bank and the national resolution
authority, and they prevail over previous decisions adopted by the national
resolution authority on the same matter.57
Unlike the EBA, the SRB can also impose administrative penalties—in
particular, fines and periodic penalty fines according to articles 38 and 39 of
the SRM Regulation respectively.58 The sanctioning power of the SRB is
also heavily conditioned and largely depends on the systemic risk profile of

general instructions. Under SRM Regulation Article 28(2), the SRB may request information for
other purposes such as, for example, the evaluation of resolution plans or the performance of
national resolution authorities in relation to entities that fall within the scope of application of
SRM Regulation Article 7(3)—namely, entities whose resolution falls under the direct
responsibility of the national resolution authorities, and not the SRB. See id. art. 31(1)(c).
53. The warning must: (a) refer to the draft decision of the national resolution authority that, in
the opinion of the SRB, does not comply with the SRM Regulation; or, (b) relate to SRM
Regulation Article 31(1)(a) SRB general instructions. Id. art. 31(1)(a); see also id. art. 7(4)(a).
54. Id. art. 7(4)(b).
55. In a similar fashion, the SRB may order the financial institution under resolution to adopt
any other necessary action to comply with the decision in question. See id. art. 29(2)(c).
56. Id. art. 29(2), (3).
57. On publication requirements, see id. art. 29(5).
58. Fines may also be imposed where an SRM Regulation Article 7(2) bank has failed to
supply information requested as part of the SRB’s investigatory power, where it has failed to
submit to a general investigation, in accordance with Article 35, or failed to submit to an on-site
inspection in accordance with SRM Regulation Articles 35 and 36, respectively. See id. art. 38(2).
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the bank.59 For example, the SRB has the power to impose fines only to
Article 7(2) entities and groups, and only in relation to those infringements
that are strictly specified in SRM Regulation Article 38(2).60 Furthermore,
the SRB cannot impose fines, unless it establishes that these infringements
have been committed intentionally or negligently.61 In all other cases,
namely where a bank resolution falls under the direct responsibility of
national resolution authorities, the SRB can only recommend to the
resolution authority to take action in order to ensure that appropriate
penalties are enforced in accordance with BRRD Articles 110 to 114 and
any other national law.62
II. SOME DIFFICULTIES
The EU legal regime of bank resolution is yet to be tested in practice.
Any assessment of the effectiveness of the quasi-enforcement powers of the
SRB and the EBA as a means for incentive realignment is bound to be an
imprecise science. However, even at this early stage, it is possible to spot
some sources of concern. In the remainder of this Article, I bring attention
to two of them: first, the problematic inter-institutional dynamic of the SRB
and the EBA, and second, the increased risk of legal contestation for both
the SRB and the EBA.
For expository purposes, the discussion focuses on bank resolution
within the Banking Union and the SRM. The Banking Union is an
institutional set up that provides a common framework for the supervision
of banks through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), for the
resolution of troubled banks through the SRM, and for the availability of
deposit guarantee schemes through the creation of a European Deposit
Insurance Scheme (EDIS) for Eurozone countries participating in the
Banking Union as well as those that wish to opt in.63 The SRM constitutes a
quasi-centralized system of decision-making for the resolution of banks. It
is co-extensive with the SSM and applies to all banks covered by the
59. For the purposes of the SRM, a distinction is drawn between SRM Regulation Article 7(2)
entities, groups (systemic banks) that fall under the direct responsibility of the SRB, and Article
7(3) entities that fall under the direct responsibility of national resolution authorities (less systemic
banks). See id. art. 7.
60. Specifically, the SRB must establish that a bank has failed to: supply the information
requested in accordance with Article 34, submit to a general investigation in accordance with
Article 35, submit to an on-site inspection in accordance with Article 36, or, comply with an SRB
decision pursuant to Article 29. See id. art. 38(2).
61. The SRM Regulation provides for an objective test according to which the SRB must take
into account “objective factors which demonstrate that the entity or its management body or senior
manager acted deliberately to commit the infringement.” See id. art. 38(1).
62. SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 38(8).
63. The Single Rulebook is the foundation of the Banking Union. It consists of a set of
legislative texts setting forth, amongst other things, capital adequacy requirements, rules on
deposit guarantee schemes, and a legal framework for the recovery and resolution of credit and
other financial institutions.
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SSM.64 While the chief objective of the SSM is to ensure that prudential
supervision of banks is implemented in a coherent and effective manner, the
aim of the SRM is to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks with
minimal costs for taxpayers and to the real economy.65 Compared to the
SSM and the SRM, the EDIS is still at an early stage of development.66
The ECB is responsible for the operation of the SSM.67 Bank resolution
is not part of its mandate. Nevertheless, the ECB can affect the progress of
bank resolution.68 For example, the ECB determines the systemic
significance of a bank in question, it supervises risks to the viability of
credit institutions, it takes early intervention measures to promote its
financial stability objective, and it takes action in order to ensure
compliance with EU law.69 In addition, the ECB has the power to impose
64. The SSM is established by virtue of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation (SSM
Regulation). Council Regulation 1024/2013, of 15 October 2013 Conferring Specific Tasks on the
European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit
Institutions, art. 2(9), 2013 O.J. (L 287) 63, 73 [hereinafter SSM Regulation].
65. The Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU) (CRD IV) and the Capital
Requirements Regulation (575/2013) (CRR) comprise the EU legal framework for prudential
supervision. See Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and
Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1; Directive 2013/36/EU, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, amending
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 176)
338. CRD IV implements the Basel III standards and, in addition to capital requirements, includes
a range of rules on liquidity and leverage, counterparty risk, and macroprudential standards (e.g.,
countercyclical capital buffers).
66. As of November 24, 2015, the Commission proposed for a Euro-wide deposit insurance
scheme (EDIS) under the administration of a Single Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board
within the SRB and the progressive establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Fund. See
European Commission Press Release IP/15/6152, A Stronger Banking Union: New Measures to
Reinforce Deposit Protection and Further Reduce Banking Risks (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6152_en.htm.
67. The SSM Regulation sets out: (a) the supervisory responsibilities of the ECB for credit
institutions within the Banking Union, (b) the role of the Member State competent authorities in
the Banking Union, (c) the supervisory, investigatory and enforcement powers of the ECB, and (d)
the organizational changes of the ECB relating to the SSM, concerning its independence, its
governance and accountability mechanisms. The ECB shares the responsibility for
macroprudential regulation with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the national
central banks.
68. The ECB is responsible for price stability through the implementation of monetary policy
and for financial stability through macro-prudential supervision. See TFEU, supra note 3, arts.
127(1), (2), (6). According to TFEU Article 127(6), bank resolution does not fall within the scope
of the competences that can be conferred to the ECB. Id. 127(6). On paper, the supervisory role of
the ECB only affects the scope of the supervisory remit of the EBA, leaving the scope of the
resolution powers of the EBA intact. In reality, things are different in view of the different ways in
which the ECB can influence the progress of a bank resolution. See Lastra, supra note 26, at 1207,
1210.
69. Lastra, supra note 26, at 1204–05. The SSM Regulation does not provide a definition of
what constitutes “prudential supervision.” Instead, it includes a list of subjects or matters
regarding which the ECB will carry out its supervisory activity. See Wymeersch, supra note 7, at
13, 29–30.

356

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 10

requirements on banks to carry out stress tests, which are an essential
component of resolvability assessments, as well as a range of supervisory
tasks in relation to recovery and resolution plans under certain
circumstances.70 Last but not least, the ECB determines whether a bank is
failing, or likely to fail, at the request of the SRB and can even force a bank
into recovery and resolution by withdrawing its authorization.71
The conspicuous presence of the ECB in the Banking Union adds a
further layer of complexity into the institutional set up of bank resolution.
For example, in the context of early intervention where the ex officio
involvement of the ECB is most visible, the same set of events may give
rise to potentially conflicting measures by the ECB as the macroprudential
supervisor, and the SRB as the resolution agency, if there is a coordination
failure.72 The interface of the ECB with the SRB and, where relevant, the
EBA, poses its own challenges, which merit consideration on their own
right. With this in mind, the remaining paragraphs explore the interinstitutional dynamic between the SRB and the EBA, focusing on stages of
bank resolution that fall beyond the ex officio reach of the ECB.73
A. THE PROBLEMATIC INTER-INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMIC
BETWEEN THE SRB AND THE EBA
It is misleading to think that the BRRD and the SRM Regulation
introduce a single integrated framework of bank resolution in the EU. In
fact, there are two partially overlapping institutional regimes that apply
depending on the location and the systemic significance of the bank in
question.74 First, the BRRD, in conjunction with the EBA Regulation,
70. SSM Regulation, supra note 64, arts. 4(1)(f),(i), 6(6) (setting out the supervisory
responsibilities that fall within the exclusive competence of the ECB).
71. If the ECB fails to make such a determination, the SRB retains the right to assess whether
a bank is failing or likely to fail. The ECB power to withdraw authorization is set out in SSM
Regulation Article 4(1)(a). Id. art. 4(1)(a).
72. According to SSM Regulation Article 16, the ECB can, inter alia, intervene early in order
to remove members of the management board that are not “fit and proper.” Id. art. 16(2)(m). In a
similar fashion, BRRD Article 28 empowers resolution authorities to remove senior management
when the latter has failed—for example, to draw up a plan of negotiation and restructuring of the
debt with the creditors of the bank. See BRRD, supra note 3, art. 28. As long as the failure
described in BRRD Article 28 can be seen as a failure to comply with the “fit and proper”
requirement of SSM Regulation 16, the same conduct potentially activates both the powers of the
ECB as prudential supervisor and the powers of the competent resolution authority.
73. The BRRD bank resolution comprises of: (a) a preparation and prevention stage; (b) an
early intervention stage, during which the troubled bank is typically asked to implement the
recovery and resolution plan that it has in place; and, (c) the resolution stage, upon the activation
of all the resolution powers set out in the Directive. See generally BRRD, supra note 3. The ex
officio involvement of the ECB as prudential supervisor is conspicuous during the first stage and,
to a lesser extent, during the second (early intervention). The ex officio involvement of the ECB is
far more remote and indirect during the third stage where resolution is executed.
74. Only certain credit institutions and investment firms are covered by the EU resolution
regime. These fall into three categories: (a) those located outside the Banking Union, the
resolution of which is governed by the BRRD; (b) systemic institutions located in the Banking
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establishes a network of national competent resolution authorities, which is
coordinated by and operates under the oversight of the EBA. Second, in
comparison to the BRRD regime, the SRM Regulation introduces a quasisupranational arrangement in the Banking Union—the SRM. Key features
of this arrangement include the establishment of a central decision-making
body—the SRB—and in due course the provision of a Single Resolution
Fund (SRF) for all Eurozone States, as well as other Member States that
wish to opt in.75
Under the SRM Regulation, the SRB has the overall responsibility for
the effective and consistent functioning of the SRM. The operation of the
SRM is based on a division of tasks between the SRB and the national
resolution authorities of those Member States that participate in the
Banking Union. This division of tasks depends on the systemic profile of
the bank in question and it replicates that of the SSM.76 According to SRM
Regulation Article 7(2),77 the SRB is directly responsible for drawing up
resolution plans and adopting all decisions relating to resolution of crossborder banking groups and groups which are considered significant in
accordance with SSM Regulation Article 6(4).78 In addition, the SRB is
directly responsible for the resolution of groups in relation to which the
ECB has decided to exercise directly all relevant powers, as well as those
non-group entities referred to in SRM Regulation Article 2.79 Furthermore,
SRM Regulation Article 5(1) provides that, where the SRB performs tasks
and exercises powers, which pursuant to the BRRD are to be performed or
exercised by the national resolution authority, the SRB shall be the relevant
national resolution authority (or in the event of a cross-border group
resolution, the relevant group-level resolution authority).80 Accordingly, in
relation to the resolution of systemically significant banks, the role of the
national resolution authorities is confined to assisting the SRB in resolution
planning, contributing to the preparation of the resolution decisions, and
implementing the SRB resolution schemes.81 Institutional dynamics change
Union/SRM that are directly supervised by the ECB; and, (c) less systemic institutions in the
Banking Union/SRM that are directly supervised by national competent authorities. Insurance
firms and central counterparties are not covered by the BRRD or the SRM Regulation.
75. An Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) between the participating Member States
regulates the transfer of contributions by the participating national resolution authorities to the
Fund and the mutualization of the financial resources. On the SRF and the IGA, see SRM
Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 1, 67. The SRF is expected to reach its target level on January 1,
2024. SRM Regulation Article 69(1) specifies a transitional period of 8 years, starting from
January 2016. Id. art. 69(1). The purpose of the SRF is to give some financial aid, such as a
guarantee or a loan, on the short and medium-term to ensure the restructured bank’s viability.
76. Id. art. 7(2); see also GRUNEWALD, supra note 1, at 219 (arguing that the SRB enjoys
broad discretion in several aspects of bank resolution).
77. SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 7(2).
78. SSM Regulation, supra note 64, art. 6(4).
79. The relevant ECB decision is taken by virtue of SSM Regulation Article 6(5). Id. art. 6(5).
80. SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 5(1).
81. Id. at pmbl, paras. 28, 42.
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in relation to less systemic banks, namely banks other than those referred to
in SRM Regulation Article 7(2). These are typically small and medium size
domestic banks.82 National resolution authorities remain directly
responsible for the resolution of those less systemic banks subject to certain
exceptions, as for example when the SRF is to be used.83
This allocation of competences between the SRB and national
resolution authorities reveals that by and large the resolution of less
significant banks remains a national affair. The control of the SRB over the
resolution of less systemic banks is envisaged to be remote, leaving ample
space for the national resolution authorities to exercise a level of discretion
that is comparable, albeit not identical, to the one that national resolution
authorities typically enjoy outside the SRM.
The SRB is not the sole EU agency with an explicit bank resolution
mandate. Outside the Banking Union, national resolution authorities are
directly responsible for bank resolution, although they now have to act
under the oversight of the EBA, and in accordance with their domestic laws
transposing the BRRD into their respective jurisdictions. At least on paper,
the EBA has a leading role in promoting the consistent application of the
BRRD. Pursuant to its broad mandate for all matters of banking supervision
and regulation in, and outside the Banking Union, the EBA performs a
range of functions pertaining to standard setting, supervision, coordination,
mediation, and enforcement.84 The EBA’s role in recovery and resolution is
evident in BRRD Article 125(1), which brings resolution authorities within
the definition of “competent authority” of the EBA Regulation, Article 4(2),
and thus within the spectrum of the EBA powers. It is also enshrined in
Article 8(1)(i), which outlines the EBA powers and tasks in respect of bank
recovery and resolution, and in Articles 25 (Recovery and resolution
82. Id. art. 7(2).
83. Id. art. 7(3).
84. The EBA drafts technical standards and implementing standards (EBA Regulation Articles

10 and 15, respectively) and non-legally binding guidelines and recommendations (EBA
Regulation Article 16). See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, arts. 10, 15–16. Technical and
implementing standards take the form of Regulations and Decisions and, once endorsed by the
Commission, they become directly applicable and are subject to judicial review. Id. EBA may
issue guidelines and recommendations, for example, in relation to the interpretation of the
different circumstances when an institution is to be considered failing or likely to fail under the
BRRD. BRRD, supra note 3, art. 27(4). According to Grunewald, the EBA is going to influence
bank resolution policy and supervisory practices immensely through its rulemaking mandate. See
GRUNEWALD, supra note 1, at 211; see also EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17 (“Breach of
Union Law” setting out the procedure pertaining to the EBA’s role in enforcement and further
discussed supra at Part I); id. art. 18 (on EBA as a coordinator in emergency situations), with id.
art. 36 (on EBA’s role in ensuring the smooth functioning of colleges of supervisors); id. art. 19
(on EBA’s role in resolving disputes). Other tasks of EBA include the promotion of a common
supervisory culture, the assessment of market developments, the monitoring and management of
systemic risk, the undertaking of a supporting role in relation with third states, and the provision
of opinions to the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on all issues related to
areas of competence. See id. arts. 8, 32, 34, respectively.
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procedures) and 27 (European system of bank resolution and funding
arrangements) of the EBA Regulation.85
Article 25 focuses on the contribution of the EBA in coordinating
action, identifying best practices for the resolution of failing banks and
setting technical and implementing standards.86 Article 27, on the other
hand, describes the tasks of the EBA in relation to funding arrangements,
making special reference to the development of methods for the resolution
of failing financial institutions, the assessment of the need for a system of
coherent and robust funding mechanisms, the role of the EBA in ensuring
fair burden sharing, and incentives to contain systemic risk as part of a
coherent and credible resolution framework.87 The resolution mandate of the
EBA is further explicated in various BRRD provisions. The latter equip the
EBA with a broad range of powers to (a) draft implementing and technical
standards (e.g., BRRD Articles 5(10), 10(9), 15(4), 27(5));88 (b) coordinate
cross-border resolution; and (c) take a range of preparatory and preventive
measures (e.g., Articles 8(2) and 30(4)).89 Article 127 of the BRRD also
makes a provision for an internal EBA Resolution Committee.
Neither EBA Regulation Article 25 nor Article 27 make explicit
reference to the EBA’s quasi-enforcement powers.90 From this, it does not
follow that, as a matter of law, the EBA is banned from resorting to
enforcement when it acts within its resolution remit. Both Articles
emphasize the role of the EBA in ensuring that bank resolution is effective,
consistent, and credible. As long as enforcement is understood to be
instrumental to the consistency, credibility, and overall effectiveness of
bank resolution, the use of quasi-enforcement powers may be inferred by
the legal text. To waive any doubt to the contrary, the Preamble of the SRM
Regulation also makes clear that the EBA must maintain its role as the
guardian for the consistent application of EU law, and accordingly, retain
its existing powers and tasks in developing EU legislation, contributing to
85. In addition, EBA Regulation Article 8 makes reference, inter alia, to the quasi-rulemaking
powers of the EBA. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 8(1)(a), (2)(a)–(c). It is the task of
the EBA to contribute to the consistent application of legally binding Union acts. Id. art. 8(1)(b).
EBA Regulation also sets forth EBA’s power to issue recommendations and individual decisions
in the event of breach of Union law as part of its quasi-enforcement function. Id. art. 8(2)(d), (f).
86. Id. art. 25.
87. Id. art. 27.
88. See BRRD, supra note 3. Examples include, but are not limited to: EBA draft technical
regulatory standards specifying information that must be contained in recovery plans (Article
5(10)), the content of resolution plans (Article 10(9)), matters and criteria for the assessment of
resolvability (Article 15(4)), and triggers that activate early intervention measures (Article 27(5)).
Id.
89. Id. art. 8(2) (stating that the EBA may assist competent authorities in reaching a joint
decision with respect to the assessment of group recovery plans); id. art. (30)(4) (according to
which the EBA may assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement in relation to the
coordination of early intervention measures and the appointment of a temporary administrator in
relation to groups).
90. EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 25, 27.
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its consistent application, and enhancing convergence of resolution
practices “across the Union as a whole.”91
The co-existence of the SRB and the EBA in the SRM is problematic.
Consider the following hypothetical case study: Bank B is systemic and is
located in country C. C participates in the Banking Union, and thus B is
subject to the SRM and to the decisions of the executive session of the
SRB, which is responsible for the adoption of the resolution scheme for B.
Certain liabilities of B are to be converted into equity. This includes
liabilities L. The SRB (and the EBA) takes the view that L fall within the
scope of the bail-in tool. Accordingly, the exclusion of L from bail-in
would be in breach of BRRD Article 44(1). The national resolution
authority in C disagrees. Although it is mandated to implement the SRB
resolution scheme, to act in accordance with SRB instructions and to
exercise the conversion of L into capital,92 it nevertheless appeals to past
domestic court decisions to argue that L fit the description of BRRD Article
44(2)(d) because they emanate from fiduciary relationships.93 The national
resolution authority is also concerned that, if the bail-in applies to L, this
will go against national interest because it is bound to harm creditor
confidence and the reputation of the banking sector in C. The execution of
the conversion of L into equity ends up becoming a very controversial
matter in C causing significant delays.
Here, the same chain of events activates the quasi-enforcement powers
of both the SRB and the EBA. The SRB can initiate enforcement under
Article 29(2)(b) or (c) of the SRM Regulation, because B failed to execute
the conversion of L into equity due to the inaction of the national resolution
authority. The EBA can initiate the procedure of EBA Regulation Article
17 against the national resolution authority, where in the opinion of the
EBA, the conduct of the national resolution authority amounts to prima
facie breach of EU law—here, BRRD Article 44(1). 94
Under these hypothetical circumstances, coming across as “having
teeth” and “being able to bite” goes a long way to reinforce attempts to
realign the incentives of EU and Member State resolution authorities.
Regrettably, neither the SRB nor the EBA fit that picture.95 As it was
discussed in the previous Part,96 although the enforcement powers of the
91. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl., para. 24.
92. See id. art. 21(11).
93. These liabilities are not subject to bail-in. BRRD, supra note 3, art. 44(2)(d). SRM

Regulation Article 27(3)(d) replicates the content of BRRD Article 44(2)(d). See SRM
Regulation, supra note 3, art. 27(3)(d).
94. To be sure, the initiation of the procedure of EBA Regulation Article 17 does not always
entail that the EBA will be able to address a decision directly against the noncomplying bank. For
this to happen, the bank must be in breach of EU law of direct applicability. The typical scenario
would be when the bank fails to comply with any relevant EBA technical standards as per Article
17(6) EBA Regulation. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(6).
95. See discussion supra Part II.
96. See discussion supra Part I.
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SRB can go far enough to order banks to take a specific course of remedial
action and even impose sanctions to legal and natural persons, these powers
are heavily qualified and are to be activated in very limited circumstances.
Compared to the SRB, the EBA has broader quasi-enforcement remit, in the
sense that its quasi-enforcement powers are activated for any alleged breach
of EU law that falls within the broad scope of EBA Regulation Article
17(1).97 However, this does not place the EBA in a more dominant position.
First, the EBA can direct binding decisions to banks only in relation to
breaches of EBA standards of direct applicability. Second, the EBA cannot
directly impose any sanctions. The SRB can impose sanctions in relation to
any of the infringements specified in Articles 38(2) and 39(3) of the SRM
Regulation.98
In a hypothetical scenario like the one above, being able to tell who acts
and when is also paramount. The action of the SRB and the EBA must be
orchestrated very carefully to ensure that all instances of regulatory
incentive misalignment fall within the remit of either of the two EU
agencies (i.e., the SRB and the EBA). Otherwise, the treatment of
misaligned incentives is likely to fall in an institutional vacuum. To be sure,
it is not possible to set out all the details of the institutional interaction of
the SRB and the EBA in legislation.99 Still, the less that is left to be
determined by memoranda of understanding and ad hoc communications,
the more transparent, certain, and predictable the coordination of the SRB
and the EBA actions is expected to be.100 The SRM Regulation does not
clearly set the jurisdictional boundaries of the SRB and the EBA.
Typically, the SRB is expected to be the first to take action in
preclusion of the EBA when it is directly responsible for the resolution of
the failing bank in question. This will be the case in three occasions: (a) in
the course of the resolution of a systemically significant bank; (b) where
resolution concerns a less systemic bank, but the SRF is to be used; and (c)
at the request of the national resolution authority.101
Where the SRB is empowered to take enforcement action but decides
not to, a question to ask is whether the EBA can intervene where all
conditions of EBA Regulation Article 17 are met. The answer to this
question essentially depends on the impact of the activation of the SRB
quasi-enforcement powers over those of the EBA. The conspicuous
97. EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17.
98. For example, fines or periodic penalties against a bank that fails to submit information

requested according to Article 34 of SRM Regulation. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, arts.
38(2)(a), 39(1)(a).
99. For discussion of similar problems at national level, see Andromachi Georgosouli, The
FCA-PRA Coordination Scheme and the Challenge of Policy Coherence, 8 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 62–
76 (2013).
100. Lack of certainty and predictability could be grounds for judicial review. See infra, note
116.
101. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 7(3), 7(4)(b), 7(5).
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leadership role of the SRB in the SRM lends support to the view that the
activation of its quasi-enforcement powers suspends those of the EBA.
However, the trouble with this line of argument is that the activation of
SRB enforcement powers does not address regulatory incentive
misalignment; the SRB’s exercise of those powers does. If the SRB decides
not to take any further action, and the EBA is deprived of the power to start
investigations, then regulatory incentive misalignment will be left
untreated. Consequently, it is more sensible to argue that the activation of
the SRB enforcement powers per se is not a sufficient condition to ban the
EBA from intervening within its remit; the EBA should be banned from
taking action only when the SRB makes actual use of its enforcement
powers.102 A further difficulty is that there is not a specific timeframe
within which this suspensive effect of the SRB quasi-enforcement powers
lasts. In the absence of a specific deadline setting unambiguous time limits
within which the SRB can act, it may be argued that the quasi-enforcement
powers of the EBA against the national resolution authority are suspended
for as long as the SRB takes some sort of enforcement action.
When the SRB is not directly responsible for bank resolution, the view
that the SRB should be the first to take action in preclusion of the EBA, is
less evident.103 The SRB can go as far as to make a recommendation to the
national resolution authority. By contrast, EBA Regulation Article 17(6)
empowers the EBA to address a decision directly to the noncomplying
bank. Furthermore, the EBA decision is binding to the noncomplying bank
and (according to the interpretation of this provision proposed in this
Article) also to the national resolution authority.104 Despite its limitations,
in the circumstances, the EBA decision seems to be a more effective legal
tool when compared with the SRB recommendation, because the SRB
recommendation is nonbinding in nature. In any case, there are other
difficulties to note. The SRM Regulation equips the SRB with the power to
issue a recommendation to the resolution authority stipulating what, in the
opinion of the SRB, would amount to appropriate course of action.105 The
relevant provisions of the SRM Regulation do not provide further guidance
about the potential involvement of the EBA. For example, it is open to
interpretation whether, in the absence of any further action by the national
102. The same argument may be made when the SRB enforcement powers are not activated in
the circumstances or when they are activated but the SRB cannot take further action because its
enforcement decision has successfully been challenged in the SRB Board of Appeal.
103. Where the SRM is used for the resolution of less systemic banks, the SRB exceptionally
replaces the national resolution authorities. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 7(3) (“If the
resolution action requires the use of the Fund, the Board shall adopt the resolution scheme.”).
104. This may be inferred, first, by the fact that the EBA decision prevails over previous
decisions of the national resolution authority on the same matter and, second, because national
resolution authorities are legally mandated to comply with the decisions of the EBA in exercise of
its quasi-enforcement powers. See EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(7).
105. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 7(2), (5), 29(1).
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resolution authority, it is obligatory for the EBA to at least start
investigations about a prima facie breach of EU law following the SRB
recommendation. Similarly, the SRM Regulation does not specify the
impact of the SRB recommendation to future enforcement decisions of the
EBA, to the extent that the content of the SRB recommendation is of
relevance to breaches of EU law that fall under the remit of the EBA quasienforcement powers. For example, it is not clear whether the SRB
recommendation is binding to the EBA, or whether the EBA has the
discretion to ignore it.
The preceding analysis does not offer a comprehensive overview of all
possible scenarios of the likely interaction of the SRB and the EBA in the
future. Nevertheless, it makes plain that in many respects, the interrelation
between the SRB and EBA is difficult and quite perplex because the SRM
Regulation falls short from settling the scope of the quasi-enforcement
powers of the SRB and the EBA in an unambiguous manner. In view of the
limitations of memoranda of understanding and ad hoc channels of
communication, it is tempting to recommend that the best way forward be
for the EBA to confine itself to the role of standard setter, coordinator, and
mediator on matters of bank resolution. Past and present experience with
the EBA’s approach to the execution of its mandate seems to support that
view. However, from this it does not follow that enforcement inertia is an
optimal strategy in the long term and in all circumstances.
The new legal and institutional landscape of the BRRD and the SRM
Regulation has begun to change the parameters that the EBA must take into
account before deciding to take or abstain from any drastic form of
intervention, both in and outside the Banking Union. In the past, there was
no provision for a unifying EU legal and institutional framework for bank
resolution, and accordingly, no set of harmonized rules on bank resolution
for the EBA to ensure their consistent application in all Member States.
Domestic regulators were much more independent in exercising judgment
about how to deal with a defaulting bank. With the entry into force of the
BRRD and the SRM Regulation, this has changed leaving, however, the
quasi-enforcement powers of the EBA intact. The BRRD does not introduce
any exception to the role of the EBA as the quasi-enforcer of EU law, while
the SRM Regulation tries to do the impossible, namely to secure the leading
role of the SRB in the SRM preserving at the same time the role of the EBA
as the guardian of the consistent application of EU bank resolution rules in
all 28 Member States, including those participating in the Banking Union.
Despite the perplexity of the dual activation of the quasi-enforcement
powers of the SRB and the EBA in the SRM, the fact remains that the very
limited scope of the SRB’s enforcement powers engenders circumstances
where misaligned incentives are left untreated undermining thus the
effectiveness of bank resolution. This on its own seems to suggest that there
is a case to be made for a parallel enforcement mechanism to complement
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that of the SRB with the EBA willing to deploy all its powers so that it
comes to the aid of the SRB, where the SRB cannot take any enforcement
action. Consequently, the rationale for keeping up with the strategy of
inertia is now less compelling.
In the future, the EBA may have to reconsider the wisdom of holding
back from enforcement out of pragmatic reasons. The resolution of small
and medium size banks is a case in point in this regard.106 It is a mistake to
think that banks of that type are not important. In fact, they control a good
part of bank assets in the Eurozone.107 Therefore, the resolution of these
banks matter.108 The default of a small domestic bank may not be systemic,
but simultaneous defaults of small banks of a particular Eurozone country
potentially are.109 Such a scenario may sound farfetched at present, but it
cannot be precluded in the future, at least in Eurozone countries like
Germany, Austria, and Italy where there is a notable concentration of small
banks.110 As long as it is understood that the SRB is not mandated to
assume the direct handling of a multitude of domestic bank resolutions in a
specific Member State, there is a strong case to expect that the EBA will not
hesitate to step in and take the necessary action should there be delays or
other obstructionist conduct from national resolution authorities.111
The fact that the ECB has the power to intervene early enough to take
the supervision (but not the resolution) of these less significant banks away
106. For recent discussion, see Ashoka Mody & Guntram B. Wolff, The Vulnerability of
Europe’s Small and Medium-sized Banks (Bruegel Working Paper No. 2015/07, 2015),
http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/WP_2015_07_160715-2_01.pdf.
Although Mody and Wolff do not examine the systemic impact of a simultaneous default of more
than one small or medium size bank, they demonstrate that the vulnerability of those banks is
probably underestimated. They argue for their restructuring as an antidote to the phenomenon of
prolonged deflation, noting that the prolonged deflation could exacerbate financial vulnerabilities
if not treated swiftly. Id. at 21.
107. VERON, supra note 23, at 13 (noting that out of the 3,520 less significant banks, 1,688, or
48% of the total number, are concentrated in Germany, 16% in Austria, and 15% in Italy).
108. Wymeersch, supra note 7, at 29 (arguing that the failure of even a small bank may have a
domino effect on the entire financial system, while the possible shock to public confidence may
lead to a wider crisis, citing the collapse of Northern Rock bank and the Spanish cajas as
examples).
109. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment
Firms and Amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC,
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, at 8,
COM (2012) 280 final (June 6, 2012) (acknowledging that the systemic importance of a bank
failure cannot be determined with full certainty in advance and noting that the “simultaneous
default . . . of many small institutions making up a significant part of the banking sector in a
country may have equally devastating effects on the economy.”).
110. See VERON, supra note 23, at 13.
111. Recent experience with the resolution of Popular (Laiki) Bank in Cyprus suggests that the
resolution of a bank at the domestic level is heavily politicized and that it tends to undermine
public confidence. For a general discussion, see Demetra Arsalidou & Maria Krambia-Kapardis,
Weak Corporate Governance Can Lead to a Country’s Financial Catastrophe: The Case of
Cyrpus, 4 J. BUS. L. 361 (2015).
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from the national prudential regulators does very little to dampen the belief
that bank nationalism—historically, a key source of regulatory incentive
misalignment in Europe—is to be tolerated.112 As long as banks continue to
pass the ECB stress tests, the authority of national prudential regulators
over the supervision of those banks will be left intact. The SRB is
empowered to take the resolution of those banks away from national
resolution authorities, but the exercise of such a power is likely to be
seriously hampered.113 The first thing to note is that the SRB is endowed
with the discretion to extend all its powers to less significant banks in order
to ensure the consistent application of high resolution standards. In other
words, this power is not to be deployed for the purposes of responding to
the ECB decision to take the prudential supervision of less significant banks
away from national supervisors, so that both matters of prudential
supervision and resolution are decided at EU level. In addition, the decision
of the SRB to replace national resolution authorities by becoming directly
responsible for the resolution of such banks is entirely discretionary and the
SRB may elect not to go down that path. The use of this discretion is also
problematic due to the interpretive ambiguity that surrounds the term “high
resolution standards” and the concomitant difficulty to distinguish those
“high standards” from other resolution standards since a discernible
category of bank resolution norms of different legal status and of different
hierarchical ordering is actually nowhere to be found in the text of the
BRRD and the SRM Regulation. Purely pragmatic grounds may also
militate against taking this course of action as, for example, pressing time
constraints and the need to prioritize goals in an attempt to make the best
possible use of limited resources.
The remarks above carry extra weight once we consider the experience
so far with the use of the bail-in tool. The passing of legislation that prefers
bail-ins over bail-outs through the transposition of the BRRD in all Member
States is a welcome development. That said, we learn from the recent past
that even in those occasions where domestic legislation had made
provisions for the activation of the bail-in tool before the entry into force of
the BRRD, the hesitation to go down that route has been notorious out of
fear that bail-in would put other local banks at a competitive
disadvantage.114 There is no reason to believe that things will be different in
112. For further discussion on bank nationalism, see VERON, supra note 23, at 20–22.
113. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 7(5).
114. VERON, supra note 23, at 33 (noting the bailout of the Dusseldorfer Hypothekenbank in

Germany). In addition to Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the UK have already provided
for bail-in tools in their respective jurisdictions. See Tomas Arons, Recognition of Debt
Restructuring and Resolution Measures Under the European Union Regulatory Framework, 23
INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 57, 60–62 (2014). So far the use of the bail-in tool is far from
satisfactory and there has been a clear preference for traditional resolution tools according to the
pre-BRRD domestic regimes. See, e.g., Letter from Maria Mavridou, Dir., Resolution Unit, Bank
of Greece, to Andrea Enria, Chair, European Banking Auth. (Dec. 18, 2015),
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the future. As long as public perceptions continue to see the fate of such
banks as inseparable from local or domestic interests, protectionist attitudes
are to be expected.
To conclude, the wisdom of enforcement inertia is not self-evident in
the long term when looking through the lens of the EBA. It seems that the
EBA has a lot to lose. As long as the obstructionist conduct of the national
competent authority can be seen as a prima facie breach of EU law, it will
be difficult for the EBA to avoid the blame game, let alone manage the
reputational cost of its perceived failure to use all its powers to put an end
to the tactics of the national competent authority. This time, the deplorable
accusation would be that the EBA could have done something, but it
decided to do nothing.
B. INCREASED EXPOSURE TO LEGAL CONTESTATION
The decisions of the SRB and the EBA are subject to double judicial
review.115 This Part does not offer an exhaustive account of all the grounds
on the basis of which the exercise of the quasi-enforcement powers of the
SRB and the EBA may be reviewed.116 Its aim is only to demonstrate that,
despite the recent favorable jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) to the ESAs, the SRB and the EBA are not sufficiently immune from
legal contestation. This is troubling because it jeopardizes the effectiveness

http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1331379/18122015_EBA+notification+Peloponnese.
pdf; Letter from Helmut Ettl & Klaus Kumpfmüller, Exec. Dirs., Austrian Fin. Mkt. Auth., to
Andrewa
Enria,
Chair,
European
Banking
Auth.
(Mar.
1,
2015),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/1005302/Letter+from+Austrian+Financial+Market+
Authority.pdf.
115. The judicial accountability of the EU resolution authorities has two components: on the
one hand, internal proceedings before the SRB Board of Appeal in the case of the SRB, and before
the ESA’s joint Board of Appeal in the case of the EBA (SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art.
85(3); EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 60); and, on the other hand, proceedings before the
European Court of Justice (SRM Regulation, supra note 3, at 86; EBA Regulation, supra note 13,
art. 61). Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies Between Meroni and Romano or the Devil and the Deep
Blue Sea, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1055, 1075 (2011) (Noting, in relation to the European
Supervisory Agencies in the financial sector, that the role of EU agencies in the implementation of
EU policies remains on shaky legal grounds. The Lisbon Treaty did not touch this issue. It only
went as a far as to update the system of judicial protection under TFEU Articles 263 and 267).
116. TFEU Article 263 stipulates four grounds of judicial review: “lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the [TFEU] or of any rule of
law relating to [its] application, or misuse of powers.” TFEU, supra note 3, art. 263(2). Other
principles of administrative law that have been recognised over the years as the foundation of
judicial review include those of proportionality, legal certainty, legitimate expectations, equality,
and procedural justice. Id. Arts. 263, 267. According to TFEU Article 263, the legality of all acts
is subject to review save the legality of recommendations and opinions. Id. art. 263(1). This covers
legislative acts, delegated acts, and implementing acts, whether in the form of regulations,
directives, or decisions. Other sui generis acts may also be reviewed provided that they have
binding force or produce legal effects as, for example, in Case C-57/95, France v. Comm’n, 1997
E.C.R. I-1627. For a general discussion, see PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 246 (2d ed.
2012) .
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of EU agency enforcement action as an incentive realignment tool.117 To
demonstrate this point, special reference is made to the SRB and the EBA
decisions that are addressed directly to noncomplying banks.118 The focus
on these enforcement decisions is appropriate. They are binding and taken
during the final stages of the enforcement procedure, typically as a last
resort when all other means of intervention (e.g., by way of instructions,
investigations, and recommendations) have failed to overcome delays or
other obstacles during the implementation stage of a bank resolution.
Moreover, these decisions may go in hand with the imposition of sanctions.
The possibility of judicial review on the grounds of what has become
known as the Meroni doctrine is of particular interest.119 Meroni & Co. v.
High Authority of the European Coal & Steel Community concerned the
first generation of European agencies in the context of the European Coal
and Steel Community at a time when EU administrative law was at an
embryonic stage of development. In this landmark ECJ case, the European
agency in question was governed by private law and was delegated with the
implementing task to ensure the equalization of ferrous scrap.120 In relation
to the powers of this European agency, the ECJ drew a distinction between
the delegation of clearly executive powers and the delegation of
discretionary powers, and ruled that it is unlawful to delegate powers that
involve the exercise of a wide margin of discretion to those entities (Meroni
doctrine).121
More recently, the ECJ had the chance to interpret the Meroni doctrine
in the United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (Short Selling Ban)
case,122 where the UK brought a legal action against the EU Parliament and
117. Tridimas, supra note 28, at 81 (referring to the ESMA and arguing that enforcement
decisions are among those most likely to be legally challenged due to their highly intrusive
nature).
118. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 29(2); EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17(6).
119. Case C-9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Auth. of the European Coal & Steel Cmty., 1958
E.C.R. 133. Meroni concerned sub-delegation of Commission regulatory (rulemaking) powers to a
private agency. See also Case C-98/80, Giuseppe Romana v. Institut Nat’l d’Assurance Maladie
Invalidite, 1981 E.C.R. 1241 (standing for the principle that it is not permissible to give agencies
power to adopt measures of general application); Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Agency Design in the
European Union, 28 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 309 (2010) (arguing that Meroni assumed
greater significance in the realm of EU agentification).
120. See Case C-9/56, Meroni & Co. 1958 E.C.R. 133, 136.
121. Id. at 152.
122. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (Short Selling Ban) (Jan. 22,
2014) [hereinafter Short Selling Ban Case], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?te
xt=&docid=146621&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&o
cc=first&part=1&cid=795071. The dispute at issue in Case C-270/12 centered upon Short Selling
Regulation Article 28, which conferred to ESMA the power to temporarily ban short selling in
threatening circumstances with cross-border implications, where national authorities failed to take
sufficient measures to address the threat. For a critical analysis of this case see Isidora Maletic,
Delegating Harmonization of the Internal Market: The Ruling in Case C-270/12 United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European
Union (Short Selling Ban), Judgment of 22 January 2014, 33 Y.B. EUR. L. 501 (2014).
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the Council for the annulment of Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012
(Short Selling Regulation).123 According to this provision, the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) can ban certain short selling
practices temporarily, when there is a threat to the orderly functioning and
integrity of financial markets or the stability as a whole or part of the
financial system in the EU.124 This power extends to the imposition of
notification and disclosure requirements on market actors, and to the
prohibition or limitation on the entry into certain transactions. The UK
asked for the annulment of Short Selling Regulation Article 28 on four
grounds, one of them being that the Article delegated powers to ESMA that
went beyond harmonization in breach of TFEU Article 114.125
Commenting on the UK’s claim that Short Selling Regulation Article
28 conferred powers that went beyond harmonization, the ECJ determined
that in areas of complex technical nature, TFEU Article 114 affords a level
of implicit discretion about the most appropriate method of
harmonization.126 In addition, it clarified that under certain circumstances,
Article 114 may justify the taking of measures directly addressed to market
actors.127 Accordingly, the disputed Short Selling Regulation Article 28 was
within the permitted scope.128
The ruling of the ECJ in Short Selling Ban marks an important
development in the jurisprudence of TFEU Article 114.129 While in Meroni,
the ECJ held that it is unlawful to delegate powers that involve the exercise
of a wide margin of discretion, in Short Selling Ban, we see a more refined
interpretation of the Meroni doctrine. According to this interpretation, the
delegation of a wide margin of discretion to EU agencies is lawful as long
as it is heavily conditioned and subject to appropriate supervisory and
accountability benchmarks.130
The approach adopted by the ECJ in Short Selling Ban is pragmatic and
is thought to be favorable to ESAs, including the EBA and any other EU
agency—most notably the SRB—the design of which is informed by the
same principles.131 Broadening the scope of the application of TFEU Article

123. See Short Selling Ban Case, supra note 122.
124. Regulation 236/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 On

Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1 [hereinafter Short
Selling Regulation].
125. Short Selling Ban Case, supra note 122, paras. 27–34.
126. Case C-66/-04, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, 2005 E.C.R. I-1033.
127. Case C-217/04, United Kingdom v. Parliament, 2006 E.C.R. I-3789, 3806.
128. Short Selling Ban Case, supra note 122, paras. 27–34.
129. Jacques Pelkmans & Marta Simoncini, Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA Can Help Build the
Single
Market,
CEPS
COMMENTARY
(Feb.
18
2014),
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Mellowing%20Meroni.pdf. (last visited Nov. 27, 2015).
130. CRAIG, supra note 116, at 255.
131. See Eilis Ferran, European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can Work 20–21 (Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 30/2014, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
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114 accommodates a range of tangible considerations.132 For example, Eilis
Ferran points out inter alia that the proper functioning of the Single Market
depends on the effectiveness of the single resolution framework both within
and outside the SRM, and that similar to those of market integrity, investor,
and financial consumer protection, financial stability measures also fall
within the scope of TFEU Article 114.133 All these remarks make sense, but
are nevertheless problematic. They are consistent with earlier ECJ
jurisprudence, according to which an existing power also comes with
implied powers as long as these implied powers are reasonably necessary.134
They also explain the expediency of a flexible interpretation of TFEU
Article 114. A flexible interpretation is recommended to facilitate EU
agencies in the swift execution of their tasks. Nevertheless, one should not
be quick to jump to the conclusion that any future appeal to this judgment
will always guard the SRB, and where relevant, the EBA against legal
contestation.
To elaborate, the respective powers of the SRB and the EBA may be
similar to the power of the ESMA under Short Selling Regulation Article
28, but not identical. There are several differences to note. Specifically, the
decisions of the ESMA result in measures, which are only temporary.135
The decisions of the SRB and the EBA are not meant to bear out temporary
effects. The power of ESMA to ban certain short selling practices extends
to the imposition of notification and disclosure requirements, and the
prohibition or limitation on the entry of certain transactions, namely the
taking of very specific measures. The content of the decisions that the SRB
and the EBA can direct to noncomplying banks is more open-ended, as it
will have to reflect the steps that the bank must take in order to remedy its
initial failure to comply with relevant Union law. The ESMA powers under
Short Selling Regulation Article 28 are to be used only in exceptional
circumstances.136 Although the circumstances allowing the SRB, and where
relevant the EBA, to use their quasi-enforcement powers may also be
characterized as exceptional, the absence of the any explicit reference to
“exceptional circumstances” in the relevant text of the SRM Regulation and
EBA Regulation introduces ambiguity. In any case, it allows scope to argue
that EU agencies need not, as a matter of law, demonstrate that the
?abstract_id=2426247 (offering a comprehensive summary of reasons that explain the merits of
this decision).
132. Id. (in relation to the SRB).
133. Id.
134. CRAIG, supra note 116, at 370–71; compare Case 8/55, Fèdèration Charbonniére de
Belgique v. High Authority, 1956 E.C.R. 245, 280 (adopting a narrow formulation of implied
powers), with Case C-176/03, Comm’n v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. I-7907 (adopting a wider
interpretation of implied powers).
135. See Short Selling Regulation, supra note 124, art. 28(7)(a), (10).
136. Article 28 of the Short Selling Regulation is entitled: “ESMA intervention powers in
exceptional circumstances.” Id. art. 28.
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circumstances are “exceptional” in order to address a decision directly to
the bank. In view of these differences, it should not be taken for granted that
the ruling of the ECJ in Short Selling Ban will offer a safe harbor for the
SRB and the EBA. Most probably, a more liberal interpretation of TFEU
Article 114 would be required in the future, but this cannot be warrantied,
as the scope of application of the harmonization clause cannot be
overstretched perpetually.
The line of argument of the UK in Short Selling Ban follows a wellestablished way of thinking about the constitutionality of the delegation of
powers to EU agencies. According to this school of thought, the issue of
constitutionality is to be assessed by focusing on whether these powers bear
out “harmonizing” measures or not; if the measures can be characterized as
such, they fall within the scope of TFEU Article 114. However, there is a
different way to approach the issue of constitutionality. The quasienforcement powers of the SRB, and where relevant, the EBA, seem to
suggest that there are actually two different kinds of harmonization
measures. On the one hand, one finds harmonization measures that involve
replacing—or even overriding—Member State level decision-making (here,
decisions of national resolution authorities) with EU level decision-making
(by the SRB or the EBA, as the case may be) on an ad hoc basis and with
binding effect.137 On the other hand, one finds harmonization measures that
do not entail this ad hoc substitution. SRB instructions, recommendations,
and directions fall within the second category, as do the recommendations
of the EBA. SRB and EBA decisions that directly target noncomplying
banks fall within the first category because they bear a dual dimension. Like
other typical measures for the approximation of laws, these decisions
perform a harmonizing function; however, unlike other harmonizing
measures, they also override Member State decision-making with binding
effect.
This distinction is of practical importance. It opens up the possibility
for a more nuanced line of argument on the basis of which the
constitutionality of the SRB and the EBA’s quasi-enforcement powers may
be challenged. According to this argument, the real issue at stake is not
whether enforcement decisions are harmonizing measures or not. Rather,
the actual question to ask is whether TFEU Article 114 offers a satisfactory
threshold of legitimacy to justify delegating to EU agencies powers the
exercise of which in essence readjusts the institutional balance between EU
and Member State agencies on ad hoc basis and with a binding effect. To
elaborate, this argument does not dispute the nature of the SRB and the
EBA enforcement decisions as “harmonizing.” It does, however, posit that
137. Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, paras. 40, 50 (Sept. 12, 2013)
(Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?doc
id=140965&doclang=EN.
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this is beside the point. On this view, it is not accurate to say that binding
SRB or EBA decisions against noncomplying banks “go beyond
harmonization” and thus fall outside the scope of TFEU Article 114,
because these decisions can actually be instrumental to the approximation
of laws. Similarly, it is not accurate to simply describe the SRB and the
EBA decisions as harmonizing, because this description misses their dual
dimension that was highlighted above. In other words, an approach that
focuses exclusively on the characterization of enforcement decisions as
harmonizing measures or not diverts attention from a particularly
idiosyncratic feature of these measures. This is the fact that these decisions
command to be treated as binding substitutes to decisions made at Member
State level, despite the fact that they are taken by EU agencies, the remit of
which is founded on EU secondary legislation, rather than directly on a
Treaty provision.
Where a measure for the consistent application of EU law touches on
both the issue of harmonization and the issue of ad hoc substitution of
decision-making, determining the issue of constitutionality by reference to
TFEU Article 114 (the harmonization clause) becomes controversial.138
More than any other harmonization measure, enforcement related decisions
that in essence substitute Member State decision-making with EU level
decision-making fly in the face of Member State sovereignty that is still
prominent in the quasi-federalist institutional underpinnings of the EU and,
in any case, do not sit well with the nature of the SRB and the EBA as
executionery EU agencies. The opinion of the Advocate General in Short
Selling Ban case helps illustrate this point. Referring to the power of the
ESMA to temporarily ban certain short selling practices, the Advocate
General argued that TFEU Article 352 would have been a more appropriate
legal basis compared to TFEU Article 114 because the unanimity voting
that Article 352 requires would, in his words, “have thus opened up an
important channel for enhanced democratic input.”139 The Advocate
General noted that in exercising this power, the ESMA by definition is
allowed to form “a judgment on a matter on which the relevant national
competent authority formed a different judgment.”140 The effect of this is
the creation of “an EU level emergency decision-making mechanism that
becomes operable when the relevant national competent authorities do not
agree as to the course of action to be taken.”141 In the opinion of the
138. TFEU, supra note 3, art. 114.
139. Case C-270/12, para. 58 (Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen). This constitutional

difference between the internal market clause and the flexibility clause is not a trivial matter. As
Maletic observes, “[c]onstitutional differences between the internal market and the flexibility
clauses suggest that the choice of correct legal basis is likely to remain an enduringly sensitive
topic post-Lisbon, with concomitant implications also for negotiation proceedings in the context
of agency governance.” Maletic, supra note 122, at 16.
140. Case C-270/12, paras. 27–38, 56 (Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen).
141. Id. para. 51.
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Advocate General, this is not “harmonisation, or the adoption of uniform
practice at the level of Member States,” but something different, namely,
the replacement of national decision-making with EU decision-making.142
The Advocate General is correct to point out that in effect, the exercise
of this power entails substitution of Member State level decision-making
with EU level decision-making, and that this substitution of decisionmaking is of relevance when determining the issue of constitutionality.
However, his reasoning ignores the fact that such substitution of decisionmaking can actually be instrumental to the approximation of laws. The
approximation of laws is not a one-off thing. It is ongoing and at times
involves disagreement. Measures that are capable of overcoming this
disagreement as, for example, those envisaged in Short Selling Regulation
Article 28, or measures like the SRB, and where relevant, the EBA
enforcement decisions, can only be conducive to the approximation of laws.
This fallacy notwithstanding, there is an insightful point in the Opinion of
the Advocate General, which should not be downplayed in view of its
practical implications. The Advocate General emphasizes the importance of
securing stronger democratic support for the delegation of powers to EU
agencies when, by virtue of those powers, EU agencies are free to effect the
substitution of Member State level decision-making with EU level decisionmaking on an ad hoc basis and with binding effect.143 If it is pertinent to
back up the delegation of the ESMA powers under Short Selling Regulation
Article 28 with a Treaty provision that conveys the existence of a deep level
of consensus for the delegation of those powers to the ESMA, the case for
doing the same for the delegation of quasi-enforcement powers to the SRB
and the EBA becomes even stronger. Accordingly, from the analysis of the
Advocate General, it may be inferred that where the question of
constitutionality concerns the conferral of power to take decisions that
touch on both the issue of harmonization and the issue of an ad hoc
substitution of Member State decision-making, a Treaty provision that sets
a higher threshold of legitimacy than TFEU Article 114 is to be preferred as
the legal basis for the delegation of the relevant power and ultimately as the
criterion for assessing its constitutionality. This is TFEU Article 352, which
requires unanimous voting.144
To be sure, a possible counter argument here is that it would be
expedient to simply satisfy the Treaty provision with the lower legitimacy
threshold—here, TFEU Article 114, which requires majority voting. On this
view, TFEU Article 114 is to be preferred because it provides the least
cumbersome procedure through which we can ensure that the EU agencies
will have at their disposal a wide arsenal of powers for the promotion of the
142. Id. para. 52.
143. Id. para. 58.
144. Maletic, supra note 122, at 16.

2016]

The EU Legal Framework of Bank Resolution

373

approximation of laws. Despite its merits, this line of criticism is not
entirely convincing, because it is at least equally important in the long term
to win the battle of legitimacy. The EU does not constitute a fully-fledged
federal system of public governance. No matter how pertinent it is to endow
the SRB, and where relevant, the EBA with a wide array of powers for the
purposes of the approximation of laws, the profound inter-governmental
elements of the EU demand that the conferral of these powers be backed up
unequivocally.145 Otherwise, a window of opportunity is always left for
persistent complaints about the legitimacy deficit of the EU system of
governance. It is vital to keep this sort of complaints at bay because, in the
long run, they are liable to undermine the credibility of EU agencies and
their effectiveness. Finally, the case for choosing TFEU Article 352 as the
legal basis for the delegation of the powers under examination is prescribed
by a further and admittedly more mundane consideration, namely, the need
to stop relying on the willingness, and indeed the capacity of, the ECJ to
keep broadening the scope of application of TFEU Article 114.
So far, I tried to demonstrate that, contrary to the prevailing view, the
protective shield of the ECJ ruling in Short Selling Ban is permeable as a
more refined line of legal contestation is plausible compared to the
argument put forth by the UK. However, this is not the only way to
challenge the constitutionality of the SRB and the EBA powers under
examination.
One of the principles of EU administrative law is that policymaking is
never to be entrusted with EU agencies.146 The historical evolution of EU
agencies suggests that their mandate is executionary and that their task is to
take decisions on technical matters. The ESAs (and by implication the SRB,
given the commonality of its institutional DNA with the ESAs) do not
constitute an exception to this axiom, despite the unprecedented range of
powers and level of discretion that they have been endowed with when
compared with older generations of EU agencies.147 The approach of the
145. Arguably, the power of the SRB to substitute decisions of the national resolution
authorities is less controversial. Implicit in the quasi-centralized system of decision-making of the
SRM is the presumption that, through their voluntary participation in the Banking Union, Member
States express their consent to this arrangement. It is also worth noting that, in addition to EBA
Regulation Article 17(6) decisions, the EBA replaces decisions of national resolution authorities
in two other occasions: (a) in the course of the EBA performing its role as mediator in dispute
resolution; and, (b) where the Council has declared an emergency. See EBA Regulation, supra
note 13, arts. 18(4), 19(4).
146. Case C-9/56, Meroni & Co. v. High Auth. of the European Coal & Steel Cmty., 1958
E.C.R. 133.
147. CRAIG, supra note 116, at 172 (making reference to the ESMA and the EIOPA in addition
to the EBA). Craig points out that the “the strong assumption, both legally and politically, is that
[the EBA] norms will be accepted by the Commission . . . . The legal as well as political reality is
therefore that [the EBA is] run by the Member States through top level national officials in a
manner that is at the very least different in degree and arguably in kind as compared to other
agencies.” Id. at 172–73.
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ECJ in the Short Selling Ban case supports this view. The ECJ broadened
the scope of application of the harmonization clause in order to allow the
ESMA to properly handle matters of complex technical nature. It did not
broaden the scope of application of TFEU Article 114 to give the ESMA (or
indeed any other EU agency bearing similar features) the leeway to engage
in policymaking.
If the above points hold true, then the constitutionality of the quasienforcement powers of the SRB and the EBA can also be challenged as
long as it is possible to establish that the wide discretion that is attached to
the exercise of quasi-enforcement powers is not used for the determination
of technical matters exclusively.148 To elaborate, the strong discretionary
element of the EBA’s decisions is readily discernable once we consider the
role of the Commission in the procedure that is set out in EBA Regulation
Article 17.149 Although the Commission is involved in the enforcement
process, the Commission is not the mastermind behind the EBA’s decision
to address a recommendation to a national regulator, let alone the
mastermind behind the EBA’s resolution to direct a decision against a
noncomplying bank. The EBA is the “brains” behind the enforcementrelated course of action.150
Undoubtedly, the Commission’s formal opinion is a stepping stone in
the envisaged procedure of EBA Regulation Article 17, in the sense that the
failure of the national competent authority to act in accordance with the
formal opinion of the Commission opens the way for the EBA to address a
decision directly to the noncomplying bank. However, a question to ask in
this connection is whether, in issuing a formal opinion, the Commission is
bound by the EBA’s recommendations. The wording of EBA Regulation
Article 17(4) creates ambivalence. It states that the “Commission’s formal
opinion shall take into account the Authority’s recommendation.”151 At first
sight, the provision appears to be permissive, however, in reality, the
Commission will rarely deviate from the EBA’s recommendations in view
of the EBA’s expertise and the desideratum to safeguard where possible the
credibility of the EBA as an expert ESA.152 For all intents and purposes, it
is the EBA—and not the Commission—that determines what breach of EU
law has been committed and what course of action would be required from
the national competent authority in order to ensure compliance with the
BRRD.153 In making these determinations, the EBA does not consult with
148. Tridimas, supra note 28, at 69 (arguing that “drawing the boundaries between technical
and policy matters in an area as complex as financial regulation, is notoriously difficult”).
149. EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17.
150. Tridimas, supra note 28, at 73 (arguing the same in respect of the involvement of the
Commission in the course of an enforcement procedure by ESMA).
151. Id. art. 17(4).
152. Id.
153. Tridimas, supra note 28, at 73 (arguing the same about the role of the Commission with
respect to the procedure of ESMA Regulation Article 17).
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the Commission first. The Commission’s formal opinion comes once these
determinations have been made. 154
There is a further question to ask with respect to the requirement that
the Commission takes into account the recommendation of the EBA before
issuing a formal opinion. This time the question concerns the envisaged
nature of the Commission’s involvement in the EBA Regulation Article 17
process.155 There are at least two different ways to read this provision: First,
it may be argued that the Commission is required to take into account the
recommendation of the EBA in order to review and endorse the soundness
of the EBA’s decision to issue the recommendation in question. Second, it
may be equally argued that the Commission takes the EBA’s
recommendation into account for the sole purpose of assessing the merits of
allowing the EBA to move to the next stage, which involves addressing a
decision directly to the noncomplying bank. The first interpretation of
Article 17(4) implies that the Commission is expected to assess the
substantive grounds that informed the recommendation of the EBA and—if
unfounded, in the opinion of the Commission—to issue a formal opinion
that deviates from that recommendation. The second interpretation implies
that the role of the Commission is procedural in the sense that the
Commission need only be concerned with the merits of giving the EBA the
leeway to move to the next stage. These two accounts of the nature of the
Commission’s involvement are not without difficulties. However, the first
view that sees the issuance of the formal opinion of the Commission as
procedural in character is arguably less problematic because it is more
consistent with the intended division of jurisdictional competences between
the EBA and the Commission, and the standing of the EBA as a specialist
EU agency.
Similar remarks may be made in relation to the SRB decisions
addressed to noncomplying banks. Where the SRB directs a decision to the
effect of ordering a bank in resolution to take a specific course of remedial
action, the Commission is not implicated in the absence of a similar
procedure to the one envisaged under BRRD Article 17. This is not to say
that the Commission is absent in the SRM. For instance, the Commission is
extensively involved during the decision-making process for the adoption of
the resolution scheme.156 Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the
involvement of the Commission at this stage is sufficient to warranty that
all the decisions of the SRB in subsequent stages are subject to appropriate
checks and balances, let alone to lend support to the view that, when the
SRB decides to exercise its quasi-enforcement powers, the Commission has

154. Id. (noting, inter alia, that “it is ESMA which determines what infringement has been
committed by the national authority”).
155. EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 17.
156. See SRM Regulation, supra note 3, art. 18, pmbl., paras. 24, 26.

376

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 10

a role that is at least comparable to the one that was described above in
relation to EBA.
It can be counter-argued that the delegation of the discretionary powers
that go in hand with the use of quasi-enforcement powers by the EBA and
the SRB is not problematic. On this view, this delegation of discretionary
powers is constitutional as long as the powers delegated are delineated with
precision, they are properly scrutinized, and they are amenable to judicial
review and other checks and balances.157 It is true that there are several
ways to ensure that discretionary powers are subject to judicial review and
other robust accountability requirements and to delegate those discretionary
powers in a structured and confined manner by means of detailed
provisions. Having said that, neither accountability arrangements nor
detailed legal drafting convert a judgment of policy into a determination of
technical nature. Although the powers of the SRB and the EBA are heavily
conditioned, the fact remains that in exercising their quasi-enforcement
powers, the SRB and the EBA use discretion to make determinations about
two types of issues: one issue of technical nature concerning the existence
of conditions that trigger the activation of quasi-enforcement powers (is
there a prima facie compliance failure or, in the case of the SRB, generally
a failure to apply the resolution scheme to the satisfaction of the SRB?), and
a second issue of policy regarding the exercise of quasi-enforcement powers
(is there a case to be made for the exercise of powers that essentially bring
about the substitution of Member State decision-making, and in effect, the
readjustment of the institutional balance between EU and Member State
agencies?).158 Finally, there is a third category of EU agency
determinations, namely those that inform decisions not to take action. Not
only do these decisions envelope strong elements of policy, but they also
escape the scrutiny processes that otherwise apply to EU agency
determinations that lead to a positive course of action. TFEU Article 114
may be the appropriate basis for the delegation of powers and implicit
discretion for determinations concerning issues of technical nature, but the
same cannot be firmly said for determinations concerning matters of policy,
let alone relying on TFEU Article 114 as a legal basis for the conferral of
discretion to decide inaction.159
157. Ferran, supra note 131, at 23.
158. Determinations about technical matters are, for example, the determination regarding the

alleged failure of a bank to comply with the EBA Technical Standards regarding the content of the
recovery and resolution plan in the case of the EBA, or the determination regarding an alleged
failure of a bank to comply with an SRB decision regarding the transfer of certain assets in the
case of the SRB.
159. See Case C-40/03, Rica Foods N.V. v. Commission, 2005 E.C.R. I-6184. The Advocate
General Leger argued that “[d]iscretion which is ‘political’ in nature thus corresponds to the
political responsibilities which a Community provision confers upon an institution,” and as such it
should be distinguished from the “discretion of a ‘technical’ nature.” Id. paras. 45–46. In the
administrative field, the discretion of EU agencies should always remain technical in nature,
strictly concerning the identification of the risks that are directly related to their expertise.
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To conclude, the debate surrounding the scope of TFEU Article 114
and whether it is an appropriate basis for the conferral of quasi-enforcement
powers to the SRB and the EBA can be a useful tool in the hands of
resentful stakeholders that seek ways to question the authority of the SRB
and, where relevant, the EBA with the view of shaking their credibility and
of causing disruptions and delays in the implementation of resolution
measures. The analysis above offered two lines of arguments on the basis of
which the constitutionality of the SRB and the EBA enforcement decisions
can be contested, neither of which disputes the fact that those decisions can
be harmonizing. According to the first argument, the SRB and, where
relevant, the EBA decisions against banks aid the harmonization of EU law,
but at the same time, they involve the ad hoc and binding substitution of
Member State decision-making with EU level decision-making. Taking into
account that harmonizing measures of this type readjust the institutional
balance between Member State and EU agencies, it is arguable that the
conferral of powers that are anchored with the taking of such measures
requires stronger democratic support than the degree of the democratic
support afforded by TFEU Article 114. On this view, TFEU Article 352
would have been a more appropriate legal basis for the delegation of such a
power. According to the second line of argument, the SRB and, where
relevant, the EBA decisions involve the exercise of discretion about both
technical as well as policy matters. Although the delegation of discretion to
determine a technical matter is constitutional, the delegation of discretion
for the determination of a matter of policy is, at best, founded on precarious
constitutional premises.
III. CONCLUSION
In theory, the SRB and the EBA can resort to enforcement to manage
risks associated with regulatory incentive misalignment at the Member
State level. In practice, there are some difficulties. This Article considered
two of them: the problematic inter-institutional dynamic of these two EU
agencies in the context of the SRM, and their exposure to increased risk of
legal contestation.
There are two ways to read the institutional interplay between the SRB
and the EBA. One possibility is to proceed on the assumption that the EBA
will decide to exercise its quasi-enforcement powers, waking up from its
past inertia. The alternative scenario is to assume the opposite. Both
strategies are riddled with difficulties. The EBA’s activism is unlikely to be
sensitive to the delicate institutional balance that underpins bank resolution
in the Banking Union. The EBA’s passivity is more in line with the leading
role of the SRB on matters concerning the operation of the SRM.
Nevertheless, it is troubling because it engenders conditions whereby
regulatory incentive misalignment will have to remain untreated as, for
example, in the course of a bank resolution that falls outside the scope of
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the SRB’s immediate authority. Especially the latter case concerns a
sizeable chunk of domestic banks in the Banking Union. If regulatory
incentive misalignment is not addressed swiftly, the chances are that the
resolution of those banks will not be executed orderly either.
Turning now to the second problem, namely that of the increased risk of
legal contestation, for expository purposes, the discussion focused on the
SRB and the EBA decisions that can be addressed directly to noncomplying
banks. In this respect, it was shown that the otherwise favorable ruling of
the ECJ for the ESMA in Short Selling Ban does not provide a sufficient
safe harbor for the SRB and the EBA, should the constitutionality of their
respective powers be challenged in the future. The analysis above offered
two lines of argument on the basis of which the constitutionality of the SRB
and the EBA powers can be questioned, focusing in particular on those
powers associated with enforcement decisions directly addressed to
noncomplying banks, neither of which disputes the nature of the EU agency
enforcement action as a “harmonizing” measure. According to the first
argument, the ad hoc substitution of Member State decision-making with
EU level decision-making raises the issue of ad hoc readjustment of the
institutional balance between Member States and the EU and, as such, the
conferral of power that allows this substitution should have received greater
democratic support than the one implied by TFEU Article 114. According
to the second line of argument, the SRB, and where relevant, the EBA
enforcement decisions involve the exercise of discretion about both
technical as well as policy matters, but only the delegation of discretion
about technical matters is indisputably constitutional.
A conclusion to be drawn out of the preceding analysis is that, if there
is a case to be made for the use of EU agency enforcement as means for
incentive realignment in the context of EU bank resolution, then further
reforms will be required. The identified areas of concern point to three chief
pathways for reform. The first one is directed towards the improvement of
EU agency enforcement as a tool for incentive realignment. The second
targets the root causes of incentive misalignment at Member State level,
focusing in particular on the phenomenon of bank nationalism. Finally, the
third is geared towards strengthening the incentive-based elements that are
already interwoven into the EU system of financial regulation.
Several steps can be taken to make EU agency enforcement action more
credible, although admittedly some of them may not be realistic options at
present. Specifically, Treaty amendments would be required in order to
place the mandate and powers of the SRB and the EBA on a proper
constitutional basis, as it would befit their endowment with a broad range of
powers and discretion. At present, the Treaty of Lisbon goes as far as to
update the system of judicial protection.160 It does not provide for a role by
160. TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 263, 267; see also Chamon, supra note 115, at 1070–71.
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the EU agencies in the implementation of EU policies.161 This being the
case, the quasi-enforcement powers of the SRB and the EBA remain on
precarious legal grounds.162 Addressing this gap would strengthen the
legitimacy of the SRB and the EBA. Moreover, it would allow them more
breathing space, as it will no longer be necessary to heavily condition the
exercise of their respective quasi-enforcement powers in order to make the
delegation of such powers compatible with principles of EU Law.
Legal reform would also be required in order to clarify the jurisdictional
boundaries between the SRB and the EBA, especially in the context of the
Banking Union. For example, in relation to bank resolution that falls under
the direct responsibility of the SRB, it is important to know in advance
whether the activation of the quasi-enforcement powers of the SRB cancels
out or simply suspends the quasi-enforcement powers of the EBA, and
under what circumstances—if at all—the EBA is envisaged to complement
the efforts of the SRB to realign incentives by means of enforcement.
Similarly, in relation to bank resolution that falls outside the direct
responsibility of the SRB, the legal text of the SRM Regulation must be
amended so that there is clarity about the circumstances under which the
EBA has the power to start investigations about potential breaches of EU
law following the SRB recommendation, and the impact of the SRB
recommendation to future enforcement decisions of the EBA. The provision
of a clear timeframe within which the SRB is entitled to exercise its
enforcement powers once these are activated would also add clarity,
enhance certainty and predictability, and improve coordination between the
SRB and the EBA.
It was noted above that the SRB and, where relevant, the EBA rely on
Member State agencies for the implementation of any action taken in the
course of investigations and enforcement. Where the implementing
measures of the national resolution authorities are challenged by way of
judicial review in domestic courts, it is to be expected that the applicant will
also plead the illegality of the quasi-enforcement power of the SRB or the
EBA as the case may be.163 National courts do not have the jurisdiction to
161. See TFEU, supra note 3.
162. Chamon, supra note 115, at 1075.
163. Typically, legal and natural persons will first contest the enforcement decision of the EBA

by submitting an appeal with the Board of Appeal in accordance with EBA Regulation Article 60.
EBA Regulation, supra note 13, art. 60. If unsuccessful, EBA Regulation Article 61 provides that
they can initiate proceedings before the ECJ and according to the procedure of TFEU Article 263.
Id. art. 61. In that case they contest either the decision of the Board of Appeal or, in cases where
there is no right to appeal with the Board of Appeal, the decision of the EBA. Id. The SRM
Regulation sets out a similar procedure for the enforcement decisions of the SRB in SRM
Regulation Article 85(3), which is read in conjunction with SRM Regulation Article 86. See SRM
Regulation, supra note 3, arts. 85(3), 86. According to the latter, proceedings may be brought
against the decisions of the SRB Board of Appeal or, where there is no right to appeal, against the
decisions of the SRB. Id. art. 86. In both cases, this internal appeal procedure has no suspensive
effect, although the EBA Board of Appeal and the SRB Board of Appeal may decide otherwise.
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give binding interpretations of EU law. This being the case, the question of
the validity of the enforcement action of the SRB, and where relevant, the
EBA, must be referred to the ECJ according to TFEU Article 263. This is
bound to cause further delays, especially where the judicial review
proceedings in domestic courts have a suspending effect. A solution to this
problem might be the inclusion of a legal provision establishing a rebuttable
presumption according to which the suspension of those decisions would go
against the public interest.164
Targeting the root causes of regulatory incentive misalignment is also
paramount. Quite often regulatory incentive misalignment is a symptom of
well meant, but shortsighted national favoritism over domestic banks. As
long as Member State regulators continue to have control over the recovery
and resolution of certain banks, bank nationalism persists. It is hoped that
future political and fiscal integration will ameliorate this problem. Until
then, it will be difficult to make nationally focused resolution authorities
take ownership of the EU bank resolution agenda without abolishing the
existing dichotomy between the resolution of “systemic” and “less
systemic” banks in the SRM. Although the pragmatic considerations and
political expediency of this arrangement are well understood, the fact
remains that the close relationship between banks and their domestic
resolution agencies fosters protectionist attitudes. Looking ahead, an
alternative to the existing arrangement could be to amend the relevant SRM
Regulation provisions so that the SRB becomes directly responsible for the
resolution of all banks with the discretion of sub-delegating powers back to
national resolution authorities as a reward for those who score high in
cooperating with the SRB subject to a transparent and regularly updated
performance index.165
Speeding up progress with minimum requirement for own funds and
eligible liabilities (MREL) and with the creation of an EDIS would also
help. MREL is expected to reduce future instances whereby uncovered
depositors and retail bondholders (notably households) will have to be
asked to take the hit of a bail-in alongside shareholders of the bank in
question and other creditors. EDIS, on the other hand, can boost public
Moreover, the internal appeal procedure is a precondition before bringing proceedings before the
ECJ. Here, I am not concerned with the judicial accountability of the EBA and the SRB at EU
level, but with the judicial review of enforcement decisions in front of domestic courts, the
purpose of which is to challenge the actions that a national resolution authority takes in its attempt
to execute the enforcement decisions of the EU Resolution Agency in question. See VERON, supra
note 23, at 32 (noting more generally that resolution decisions within the SRM are likely to be
subject to double judicial review).
164. This is similar to the mechanism set out in BRRD Article 85 regarding ex-ante judicial
approval and rights to challenge decisions on the basis of which a crisis-management measure
may be taken. See BRRD, supra note 3, art. 85.
165. Since the distinction between systemic and less systemic banks in the SRM reflects that of
the SSM, the SSM Regulation should also be amended accordingly to ensure consistency between
the functioning of these two pillars of the Banking Union.
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confidence about depositor protection.166 Bank nationalism is further fueled
by differences in the insolvency laws among Member States. These
differences dilute the “no creditor worse off principle” of the BRRD and, to
the extent that they render different resolution outcomes, they encourage
introversion.167 Accordingly, more progress needs to be made with respect
to the harmonization of insolvency law in the EU, possibly towards the
direction of a sui generis insolvency law regime for banks and other
financial institutions with social functions and vulnerabilities comparable to
those of banks.168
The EU system of public governance exhibits several features of
incentive-based regulation as, for example, peer reviews, annual EU
Parliamentary reports, and various monitoring mechanisms of the EU
Ombudsman Service that aim to improve transparency and public
accountability.169 These features could be further reinforced by the
introduction of incentive audits for EU regulators under the oversight of the
EU Ombudsman Service or perhaps a separate EU agency.170 Incentive

166. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in Order to Establish a European Deposit Insurance
Scheme, COM (2015) 586 final (Nov. 24, 2015). For a critical commentary on the Commission’s
proposal for the creation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme in place of the existing
harmonized regime under the Deposit Guarantee Directive, see Daniel Gross, Completing the
Banking Union: Deposit Insurance (CEPS Policy Brief No. 335, Dec. 2015),
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/completing-banking-union-deposit-insurance.
167. The no creditor worse off principle is set out in BRRD Article 34(1)(g).
168. For a recent development in this regard, see Regulation 2015/848, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings (European Insolvency
Regulation), 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19 [hereinafter EIR]. The new EIR entered into force on June 26,
2015. Id. art. 84. However, according to EIR Article 1(2), a range of financial institutions
including banks (“credit institutions”) and investment firms are excluded from its scope of
application. Id. art. 1(2). The Directive 2001/24 traditionally covers banks (“credit institutions”).
See Directive 2001/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the
Reorganisation and Winding Up of Credit Institutions, art. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 17 [hereinafter the
Winding Up Directive]. Meanwhile, BRRD Article 117 extended the Winding Up Directive to
apply to investment firms. See BRRD, supra note 3, art. 117; see also Tomas M.C. Arons,
Judicial Protection of Supervised Credit Institutions in the European Banking Union, in
EUROPEAN BANKING UNION (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., 2015); Arons, supra note
114; Andrienne Coleton, Banking Insolvency Regimes and Cross-Border Banks – Complexities
and Conflicts: Is the Current European Insolvency Framework Efficient and Robust Enough to
Effectively Resolve Cross-Border Banks, Can There be a One Size Fits All Solution?, 27 J. INT’L.
BANKING L. & REG. 63, 81 (2012).
169. Accountability is one of the seven principles of governance that underpin the European
Union. The other six are: openness, participation, effectiveness, coherence, proportionality, and
subsidiarity. See Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 8–9, COM (2001) 482
final (July 25, 2001). This matter is further discussed in DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES &
GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 382 (3d. ed. 2014). For an overview of the evolution of
accountability mechanisms in the EU, see Anchrit Wille, The Evolving EU Accountability
Landscape: Moving to an Even Denser Union, INT’L REV. ADMIN. SCI. (forthcoming 2016).
170. See $ihák, Kunt & Johnston, supra note 9; Ross Levine, The Sentinel: Improving the
Governance of Financial Regulation (Brown University & NBER, Nov. 2, 2009),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/papers/The_Sentinel.pdf (arguing that although there
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audits have two aspects: (a) audits to align industry incentives with those of
the regulators, and (b) audits to align regulators’ incentives. The latter
should mirror those factors that influence the decision-making of regulators.
At a minimum, they should involve checking the effectiveness of
accountability mechanisms, the level of operational independence of
regulators, conflicts of interest, liability, and funding sources, culture and
incentive compatibility among agencies found in vertical and horizontal
relationships of public governance.
None of these recommendations are novel or free from controversy.
Clearly, they are not going to bring perfection. They do, however, pledge to
improve regulatory performance and this is reason enough to merit
consideration.

is a plethora of agencies none of them has the exclusive mandate, powers, and capabilities to play
that role especially at the EU level).

